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ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims to understand how information coding and the protocol that it 
supports can affect the characteristics of electronic circuits. More specifically, it 
investigates an on-line test methodology called IFIS (If it Fails It Stops) and its 
impact on the design, implementation and subsequent characteristics of circuits 
intended for application specific le (ASIC) technology. 
The first study investigates the influences of information coding and protocol on the 
characteristics of IFIS systems. The second study investigates methods of circuit 
design applicable to IFIS cells and identifies the· technique possessing the 
characteristics mOllt suitable for on-line testing. The third study investigates the 
characteristics of a 'real-life' commercial UART re-engineered using the techniques 
resulting from the previous two studies. The final study investigates the effects of the 
halting properties endowed by the protocol on failure diagnosis within IFIS systems. 
The outcome of this work is an identification and characterisation of the factors that 
influence behaviour, implementation costs and the ability to test and diagnose IFIS 
designs. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
The ability to make increasingly. complex integrated circuits (lCs) stems from 
continuing advances in microelectronic technology. Recent surveys showed that in 
1970 there were typically a thousand transistors per IC, whereas in 1990 there were a 
million. This trend is expected to continue resulting in complexities of approximately 
one thousand million transistors by 2010 [Sherwani95, Meindl87J. Increasing 
integration results in: 
• A reduction in the average costs per logic gate. This is due to reduced 
packaging costs, a reduction in the numbers of ICs required to implement any 
specific system and the associated simplification of printed circuit boards. 
• An increase in reliability for any specific system if fewer I Cs are needed to 
realise it. The need for fewer ICs results in fewer interconnections between 
them and therefore increases system reliability [Brasington95, Siewiorek92J. 
There are a number of problems associated with increased levels of integration, 
namely: 
• Larger ICs are more prone to errors. Technological advances have enabled 
both the shrinking of minimum geometry and expansions in die sizes. This 
increase in monolithic area raises the chances of manufacturing defects and 
increases the susceptibility ofICs to environmental factors. 
• Systems containing ICs are more difficult to test. This is due to increased 
circuit complexity and reduced access to internal circuit nodes. 
• The increased susceptibility ofICs to environmental factors suggests that they 
must be checked more often if their integrity is to be relied on. 
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Applications are demanding higher levels of integration and higher levels of 
confidence in system integrity. Many techniques exist that· facilitate checking of 
systems and the ICs that they contain. These techniques can be classified as: 
• Off-line testing techniques 
• On-line testing techniques 
Off-line testing techniques predominate and indeed substantial investment has been 
made in the development of such techniques. Off-line testing can be used at the time 
of system (IC) manufacture with the aim of prohibiting the shipment of faulty 
products. Enonnous efforts continue to be devoted to the development of off-line 
testing techniques in an attempt to reduce test costs while maintaining product quality. 
Despite the enonnous attention afforded to the development of off-line testing 
techniques, the pace of such developments is not keeping up with technological 
advancements [Bahram92]. This coupled with relatively high costs associated with 
production testing makes it increasingly difficult to test for all possible defects at the 
time of fabrication [Dislis95, Thompson96]. It is therefore more likely that faulty 
. products are put into service. 
. 1.2 ON-LINE TESTING 
On-line testing techniques occur concurrently with nonnal operation and thus they 
provide up-to-date infonnation without the need to set aside time for testing. The 
objectives of the on-line testing of electronic designs are twofold, namely: 
• To detect sources of failure that were caused during system manufacture but 
were not detected prior to commissioning: either those that cause logical faults 
or are responsible for premature ageing (for example, high resistance bridging 
faults or undersized metal tracks). 
• To detect errors that are caused after system commissioning. These may be 
2 
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caused by environmental conditions such as heat, vibration, alpha particles, 
user error or abuse. Intermittent and transient faults are 20 - 100 times more 
prevalent in commissioned systems than those directly attributable to 
premature ageing [Siewiorek92]. 
The testing of commissioned digital electronic systems should provide facilities for 
detecting abnormalities in system behaviour due to environmental conditions and 
wear-out in addition to compensating for the inadequacies of production testing. 
1.2.1 Problems Faced by On-line Testing 
The problems faced by on-line testing of electronic systems include: 
• The difficulty in ensuring system integrity at the time of manufacture 
combined with environmental factors makes it difficult to predict the nature of 
faulty behaviour. 
• It is difficult to differentiate between faulty operation and fault-free operation 
at any point in time because reference information is not available. Unlike the 
production (off-line) test environment, system stimuli are not pre-determined, 
and consequently system responses cannot be predicted prior to testing. 
• It cannot be assumed that correct behaviour results from structural integrity. 
Faults caused by the operating environment may not be permanent but their 
effects maybe long lasting. Intermittent and transient faults may corrupt the 
state of a system at a specific point in time. The fault may disappear leaving a 
physically fault free-system that subsequently fails. 
• Differentiating faulty behaviour from fault-free behaviour for any error that 
may occur during the lifetime of a specific system requires knowledge of the 
errors that may occur. 
• Increased system complexity makes immediate fault detection more difficult. 
The effects of an internal failure that causes a change in the state graph of a 
system may not have an immediate effect on primary system outputs. 
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On-line test techniques approach these problems by allowing additional tasks to be 
performed concurrently with normal operations, namely: 
• The generation of additional data that can be used as a dynamic reference. 
• The dynamic checking of operational data against that reference data. 
Methods of providing reference information include: 
• Hardware redundancy 
• Information redundancy 
• Time redundancy 
Often it is possible to place specific techniques under more than one redundancy 
category. In most cases, additional hardware is required even if the specific technique 
relies on re-calculating a function output during consecutive periods of time (time 
redundancy) or relies on the comparison of different representations of the same data 
(information redundancy). 
Generally, hardware redundant techniques exploit the properties associated directly 
with circuit structure to ensure the independence of operational and reference data. 
These techniques are typically applied to facilitate the checking of operational data 
calculation. 
Information redundant techniques exploit the dynamic relationship between 
operational data and reference data to facilitate checking. By knowing the relationship 
between incoming data and supplementary (reference) information, the relationship 
between outgoing operational and reference data can be predicted. Information 
redundancy is therefore used to facilitate the checking of both data calculation and 
communication. 
Time redundant techniques sacrifice data rate to facilitate on-line testing. These 
techniques can be applied to calculation, by comparison of the results of successive 
4 
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function computation or to communication by return transmission according to a 
specific protocol [Grant89]. 
1.2.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of On-line Testing 
On-line testing has a number of advantages and disadvantages associated with it. The 
advantages include: 
• On-line testing enables immediate detection of errors that could result in 
system failure. This is important for applications where loss of life or security 
could result under prolonged failure conditions. . Permanent faults and 
temporary faults are automatically flagged as soon as the system detects 
anomalous behaviour. 
• On-line testable designs can reduce the time taken for production testing 
because they incorporate response analysis facilities [Gupta96]. This reduces 
. 
communication between the device under test and the tester while also 
permitting higher clock frequencies to be used during testing. 
• While the fault-models on which on-line testing techniques are based do not 
reflect the defects common to CMOS Ies, on-line testing detects errors that 
arise from them as soon as digital values are affected. 
• On-line testing increases system availability because it removes the need for 
periodic off-line testing. 
The disadvantages associated with on-line testing include: 
• Additional action(s) must be taken before the results of on-line testing are to 
be of use. It is pointless to know that system integrity has been compromised 
unless this information results in action. This action may be undertaken by 
circuitry that itself is error prone. 
• Additional system outputs are required to represent the system error status. 
• The degree offault coverage achieved during any specific period oftime is not 
directly quantifiable during normal operation. This is because no specific 
5 
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restrictions are exercised over incoming data. 
• A complexity penalty is always incurred in comparison with the non-test 
oriented design. Depending on the technique employed, this penalty can be in 
excess of 100% for error detection. [Al-Saad96, Siewiorek92] 
• A greater complexity penalty is typically incurred to obtain a specific fault 
coverage in the on-line testing environment than for an equivalent design in 
the off-line environment. This is at least partly due to the additional 
complexity incurred by the data analysis hardware incorporated within on-line 
testable designs. 
Clearly, there are a number of disadvantages associated with on-line testing. If these 
disadvantages are to be combated, new techniques must be explored and their 
properties characterised. 
1.3IFIS 
IFIS (If it Fails It Stops) is an on-line design for testability approach that is currently 
under investigation at Loughborough University. IFIS performs error management in 
addition to error detection. If knowledge of system integrity is to serve some purpose 
then some action must be undertaken following error detection. This action may be 
performed by a dedicated error manager or by other means. When performed by a 
dedicated error manager, communication between it and the error detection 
mechanism must exist. Both the error manager and communication link may 
themselves be error prone. Error management is inherent in IFIS systems and 
therefore removes these additional sources' of potentially unchecked error. The 
additional advantages ofIFIS are summarised below: 
• The effect of a failure is propagated through to all circuit elements causing 
them all to halt. Thus, the system error status can be discovered by observing 
any primary output. 
• The need to generate and apply test vectors to propagate failures to an 
6 
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observable primary output (at the time of manufacture) is eliminated. Faults 
within IFIS cells need only be sensitised to the cell output because propagation 
to a system output is automatic by virtue of the halting mechanism. 
• The halting mechanism used to flag errors and manage the flow of erroneous 
data is not maskable and does not permit the propagation of corrupt data. 
Figure I-I shows a structure that incorporates communications supporting the above 
description. This is the generic structure of IFIS systems. Figure 1-1 shows that IFIS 
systems comprise computation elements (cells) and interconnections between cells. 
status 
Data 
stafus 
Data 
Computation 
Element 
stafus 
COmputation 
Element 
Figure I-lThe structure of IF IS systems. 
stafus 
Data 
Computation elements interpret received status information, compute some function 
of the received data and generate status information. The interconnections carry data 
and status information between computation elements. Data flows between 
computation elements in a conventional manner while status is propagated bi-
directionally to neighbouring elements. 
This type of design structure is normally associated with asynchronous digital systems 
where data is permitted to progress from its source depending on the readiness of its 
destination to receive it [Hulgaard94,David92,Sutherland89]. The destination cell 
signals its readiness to receive new data only after it has processed old data. In 
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practical asynchronous designs this signal is combined with the recently computed 
data by using information redundancy in the form of data coding [Linder96, Dean91]. 
In contrast to the data coding found in asynchronous designs, the coding found in IFIS 
designs uses information redundancy to incorporate the error status of IFIS cells 
[Jones91]. A cells error status reflects the integrity of incoming data and the status of 
neighbouring cells. 
Following the detection of an error by a computation element, the error status of the 
element is updated and the information passed to neighbouring elements. The 
neighbouring elements respond by refusing to compute and by updating their 
, associated error status accordingly. A halting of data processing results, progressing 
away from the error source until all primary system inputs and outputs are reached. 
This mechanism provides a clear error indication that cannot be ignored. 
From the behavioural description of IFIS, it is apparent that the integrity of incoming 
data and status information must be checked by each computation element before its 
local error status can be calculated. Incoming data and status information are carried 
from neighbouring elements via interconnections that may themselves be prone to 
errors. This suggests that reference information must accompany the data/status 
information to enable validation to be performed. 
A variety of communication coding techniques exist from which a suitable code must 
be selected to enable appropriate error detecting capabilities to be endowed while still 
permitting efficient data transfer. Included in the list of candidate codes is the dual-rail 
return-to-zero code presented in the original IFIS patent [Jones91]. 
The selection of reference information depends on the severity of the error to be 
detected, and the type of error that is most likely to occur. Additionally, the domains 
. of computation and communication are subject to different types of errors. For this 
reason, a method must be devised to additionally ensure the integrity of the circuit 
used to perform data computation and communication code generation. 
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From the description of halt propagation within IFIS systems, it can be deduced that 
an interesting consequence of this mechanism exists, namely: the halting sequence of 
primary system outputs must contain information relating to the. source of error. The 
utility of this information is yet to be determined. 
1.4 AIMS OF THESIS 
This thesis focuses on the IFIS on-line test methodology. More specifically, this thesis 
provides an assessment of different aspects of the methodology and offers evidence as 
to its suitability for application to on-line testable systems. This evaluation is achieved 
through the fulfilment of the following aims: 
• To identify protocol/coding schemes that provide the halting mechanism 
characteristic of IFIS systems and to assess their impact on system level test 
coverage, complexity and performance. 
• To discover the utility of the halting sequence information available at primary 
outputs for locating the source of error. 
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
This chapter has introduced and justified the need to provide on-line testing. 
Furthermore, the IFIS on-line test methodology has been presented and the aims of 
this thesis have been identified. 
Chapter 2 supports the aims of this thesis by reviewing design techniques relevant to 
IFIS. The requirements and expectations of IFIS systems are presented and the 
suitability of selected state-of-the-art techniques is assessed within this context. This 
assessment results in an identification of areas open to research. 
Chapter 3 formulates a set of objectives to meet the research aims. Furthermore, 
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investigations are introduced that target the fulfilment of the fonnulated objectives. 
Chapter 4 describes an investigation that results in the selection of a protocol/coding 
combination for future IFIS systems. The candidate IFIS protocols and data codes are 
described and the suitability of their characteristics to a design for test environment 
are assessed. 
Chapter 5 describes an investigation that assesses the influence of using specific 
structural design techniques selected from those described in Chapter 2 on the 
properties associated with IFIS cells: the fundamental components within an IFIS 
system. The investigation results in the detennination of a generic cell structure for 
future IFIS designs. 
The investigation described in Chapter 6 builds on the results of the investigations 
described in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. A complex design is realised using IFIS and 
implemented on FPGA. The resultant design is used to demonstrate the behaviour of 
an IFIS system under both faulty and fault-free conditions. The characteristics of the 
system are presented. 
Chapter 7 establishes the inherent support of failure diagnosis provided by IFIS 
designs. It also describes the limitations imposed on the resolution attainable using the 
halting property of IFIS designs as a means of diagnosis. Furthennore, Chapter 7 
describes an algorithm which can be used to perfonn fault diagnosis and introduces 
extensions to the original IFIS cell model with the goal of discovering the resolution 
implications of model extension. The algorithm is then applied to responses of the 
case study implementation under controlled fault conditions. 
Chapter 8 summarises and concludes this thesis, discussing the measure of success 
achieved with respect to this work. 
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2.1 OBJECTIVES OF CHAPTER 
The main objectives of this chapter are to: 
• Introduce the requirements imposed by the IFIS on-line test methodology. 
.. Present and compare different state-of-the-art design techniques used for on-
line testing. 
• Assess the suitability of selected techniques to IFIS identifying shortcomings 
and areas warranting investigation. 
2.2 MOTIVATION 
IFIS is a developing test methodology that uses encoded data and handshaking 
between computation elements to achieve system level on-line test [Jones91]. 
For any on-line test methodology to be widely applicable, it should result in designs 
that conform to the following requirements: 
• Same data throughput/data-flow under error-free conditions as equivalent 
conventional systems. This minimises the impact of incorporating on-line test. 
• Ability to detect a high proportion of possible system failures (error coverage). 
• Minimal delay between error detection and error flagging (error latency). 
• Minimal hardware complexity penalty. 
Furthermore, to avoid unnecessary engineering effort, while exhibiting useful 
properties, it is important that the on-line test methodology be tailored to detect and 
flag errors typical of the intended operational environment. 
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2.2.1 Typical Causes of System Failure 
.IFIS is intended for implementing systems comprising ICs and electrical 
interconnections. The type of errors to be detected by IFIS result from previously 
undetected manufacturing defects and environmental conditions. 
The faults most commonly attributed to CMOS IC manufacture are those resulting 
from missing connections (stuck-open faults) and extra connections (bridging faults) 
[Chakra94,Aitken92,Ferguson91,Champac91,Nigh90,Ma090]. Such faults often result . 
in unintended sequential behaviour and are not restricted to specific le structures. 
Under operational conditions, ICs are particularly prone to unidirectional errors. 
Unidirectional errors are characterised by ones being transfonned to zero's (I ~O) or 
vice-versa, but not both at the same. Furthennore, the direction of error cannot be 
predicted a priori. Unidirectional errors are typically associated with ROMs, RAMs 
and Bus Structures [pradhan80a,Biaum88,Piestrak95]. Current levels of integration 
are characterised by the feature that signal routing area is significant and therefore 
stands a significant chance of being a source of error [Brassington95,Sherwani95]. 
2.2.2 IFIS Specific Requirements 
IFIS imposes a specific structure to support its halting mechanism. This mechanism, 
coupled with the original specification impose two further restrictions, namely: 
• The structure of computation elements should not inherently exclude the 
computation of particular functions. This is to enable the IFIS methodology to 
be applicable to any digital system. 
• The coding used for inter-cell communications should be chosen to facilitate 
modular checker design. One function perfonned by IFIS cells is code 
checking. Incoming codes represent data and status infonnation from multiple 
sources where no restriction is applied to bus width. Checker architecture 
should support the design of different checkers accepting different numbers of 
codes, perhaps of different code widths. 
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As an on-line test methodology providing protection of computation and 
communication, IFIS should be designed using appropriate on-line testing techniques. 
Computation can be protected by hardware redundancy, information redundancy and 
time redundancy techniques, while communication requires information redundancy 
that must itself, be computed. To identify areas open to research, this review assesses 
the suitability of relevant techniques taken from each redundancy category to IFIS by: 
• Comparing the characteristics of specific redundancy techniques and 
separating them into groups containing those suitable for computation and 
those suitable for communication. 
• Assessing the communication techniques with respect to data rate, to the 
failure types expected in IFIS systems and to modular checker design. 
• Assessing the computation techniques with respect to data rate, to failure type 
and to the generation of suitable communication codes. 
2.3 HARDWARE REDUNDANCY 
All redundancy techniques aimed at on-line testing result in some hardware overhead 
with respect to their conventional counterparts. This section has however been limited 
to those techniques for which the hardware structure itself is the key to the provision 
of on-line testing. 
2.3.1 Duplication with Comparison 
In duplication with comparison (DWC), reference data and its intended duplicate are 
calculated concurrently using independent hardware. While this technique provides 
error detection capabilities, the complexity penalty with respect to a conventional 
equivalent implementation is high [AI-Saad96]. However, duplication is recognised as 
being the most effective method for checking generic logical operations 
[Avizienis71a,PateI82]. This technique has been effectively incorporated into fault 
tolerant systems to increase system reliability by identifying faulty circuitry prior to 
its resultant removal from the system [Avizienis71a,Bartlett92]. 
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2.3.2 Fault-Secure Networks 
The output from a hardware duplication scheme can be thought of as a code. Fault-
secure logic networks operate on and generate codes; however, the important feature 
. of fault-secure networks is the structure of the network used to generate the code 
rather than the code itself. By definition, the sets of all codewords and non-codewords 
combined represent all possible input (or output) combinations for a given circuit. A 
circuit is said to be fault-secure if, for every fault from a prescribed set, the circuit 
never produces an incorrect code space output for code space inputs [Anderson73]. 
In [K078,Smith78] a technique is presented for designing fault-secure circuits. The 
technique involves identifying paths from internal fault sites that can affect more than 
one output under fault conditions, thus resulting in an incorrect codeword. Once 
found, hardware is added using rninterm duplication and the paths are separated. Any 
fault is therefore guaranteed to affect only one output and consequently can only 
. result in a non-codeword output when sensitised [Smith78]. Recently, techniques have 
been developed to synthesise fault-secure state-machines [Parekhji91,Bolchini95]. 
2.3.3 N-Modular Redundancy 
N-modular redundancy (NMR) is a technique that is intended to provide fault 
masking in highly reliable systems. The underlying concept is to provide N means of 
calculating a function and propagate the most popular result. The unit responsible for 
selecting the most popular result is called a voter. A number of NMR configurations 
exist, where N is varied and/or the number of voting elements are adjusted resulting in 
a complexity/reliability trade-off [Russe1l89,Audet96]. For systems which are 
unsupervised for long periods, such as deep space missions, it was found that system 
reliability is maximised by maintaining a constant number of active elements which 
can take part in the voting process [Avizienis7Ia,Siewiorek92]. This is best realised 
by incorporating a number of additional, spare functional units that can be used as 
substitutes following identification and removal of faulty units [Russe1l89]. To adapt 
N-modular redundant designs to provide fault detection, in addition to masking, 
requires the addition of inequality detectors. A resulting disadvantage is that the 
voter(s) are never explicitly checked by the inequality checker. 
14 
CHAPTER Two REVIEW 
2.3.4 Summary of Hardware Redundancy Techniques 
Hardware redundancy techniques facilitate verification of data computation by 
employing circuit topology to ensure that normal calculations and reference 
information are not simultaneously subjected to the effects of single faults. All of the 
reviewed hardware redundant techniques exhibit the common feature that they do not 
affect the data rate during error-free operation. Consequently, these techniques do not 
incur error latency. Table 2-1 describes additional properties associated with hardware 
redundant techniques. 
Circuit Style Error Complexity Unchecked 
Coverage ('C' means Hardware 
conventional) 
DWC Any 100% 2C+ None 
Comparator 
Fault- Combinational Code :s; (2C + None 
secure / Sequential specific Comparator) 
Networks 
NMR Any 100%- (N*C) + Voter Voter 
Voter + Comparator 
Table 2-1 Properties associated with hardware redundant techniques. 
The hardware redundancy techniques ofDWC and NMR are not limited in the type of 
circuit to which they may be applied. Both can be applied to state machines, 
combinational designs and datapath structures. Conversely, fault secure networks do 
. not appear to be suitable for protecting datapath structures. Hardware redundant 
design techniques exhibit no error latency and are applicable to all known error 
models, namely: symmetric errors, asymmetric errors and unidirectional errors. 
In addition to those techniques specifically targeted at generating outputs for error 
detection, NMR techniques are intended to mask errors. The addition of an in-equality 
checker enables NMR designs to also be used for real-time error detection. However, 
this configuration does not perform any checks on the voting element itself, and 
. consequently there is no guarantee that it is not calculating incorrect information. 
While DWC offers the simplest concept targeted specifically at error detection, it is 
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that which results in the highest hardware complexity. Fault secure networks 
potentially offer the most efficient hardware implementation of the techniques 
presented, in the worst case being comparable to DWC. However, designing using the 
technique is more time consuming than with DWC because of the iteration necessary 
to ensure the independence of primary outputs under fault conditions. 
Within the context of IFIS design, the above discussion suggests that DWC is the 
most suitable hardware redundancy technique. 
2.4 INFORMATION REDUNDANCY 
Information redundancy is the technique by which data is combined with additional 
information to form codes. The code words thus represent the information to be 
manipulated but are intended to be less vulnerable to errors. Codes can be error 
detecting and/or error correcting [HanuningSO]. The context of this review is limited 
to on-line testing and therefore only error detecting codes are discussed. When 
selecting a coding strategy, the issues of error type, speed of operation, functional 
environment, code performance and the ease with which codes can be verified all 
require consideration [Pradhan80a]. The techniques for building error-detecting codes 
can be partitioned in the following way: 
• Parity codes 
• Arithmetic codes 
• Unidirectional error-detecting codes 
2.4.1 Parity Codes 
. These codes use checkbits that are calculated by performing modulo 2 addition on 
some or all information bits contained in the code. R. W. Hamming recognised the 
benefits of performing modulo 2 addition on transmission data to provide information 
redundancy capable of performing error detection [Hamming50]. The formation of 
parity codes dictates their error detecting properties and as such two distinct variations 
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exist, namely word-based and interlaced parity schemes. 
2.4.1.1 Word-based parity 
Hamming defined parity as the modulo 2 addition of selected information 
[Hamming50]. To achieve error detection, a non-code word must be detectable under 
error conditions. In the case of a single error a non-code word must exist that differs 
in one bit position from the intended code word. Thus, successive Hamming codes 
must differ in at least two bit positions. This can be achieved by the addition of a 
single parity bit to existing data. Hamming showed that in general a code exhibiting a 
Hamming distance of'd+l' can detect od' errors. [Siewiorek92] showed that by using 
a Hamming code with a distance of 2, any odd number of errors can be detected. 
Parity codes may be generated using independent calculation based upon circuit 
inputs (protecting computation) or by direct encoding of output data using modulo 2 
arithmetic (protecting communication) [Fujiwara90,GoesseI93]. 
2.4.1.2 Interlaced parity codes 
When modulo 2 addition is performed on a group of bits and an even number of errors 
occur within the group, these errors are not detected. However, by partitioning 
information into smaller groups and applying modulo 2 addition on each sub-group, it 
is only when an even number of errors occur within the same sub-group that errors 
become masked [Ko78,Fujiwara84]. The degree of error detection offered is 
dependent on the group size which in turn influences the hardware penalty incurred 
by the scheme. An extreme example of interlaced parity coding is demonstrated in the 
bitwise parity code (dual-rail code). In this case, 100% information redundancy is 
incurred by protecting each original data bit with its own parity bit [Lo93]. 
2.4.2 Arithmetic Codes 
Arithmetic codes are formed by applying some arithmetic function to the value 
represented by data bits resulting in a codeword. The original data may be directly 
retrievable (separable) from the resultant codeword or may require decoding (in-
separable) [Siewiorek92, Piestrak95]. The separable codes considered are those 
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derived from the residue number system that was introduced in [Garner59J. The in-
separable codes are those based on AN coding which was introduced in [Brown60J. 
2.4.2.1 Separable arithmetic codes 
Separable codes take the form N={X: X=DC} where D is the data symbol and C is 
the check symbol. Using the residue numbering system developed in [Garner59J, the 
check symbol (residue), C, for the data symbol, D, is [D[b, where b is the base of the 
residue code. For residue codes it is therefore possible to predict the residue part of a 
code for the output of some arithmetic function when provided with only the residue 
of the inputs to that function. This means that residue codes can be used to check 
arithmetic operations in addition to communication (transfer) operations [Sayers86J. 
A variation of residue coding is inverse residue coding where each residue bit is 
inverted with respect to that of the equivalent residue code. Inverse residue codes are 
particularly well suited to transmission enviromnents because they exhibit increased 
immunity to unidirectional errors [Avizienis71bJ. In addition to the benefits offered 
by residue codes, a number of limitations exist, namely: 
• Residue codes are not suited to checking division operations due to the 
difficulty in determining the absolute magnitude of a number associated with 
the residue [Garner59J. 
• To maintain a high error detection ability requires a large residue base 
[Avizienis71bJ. Maximising the residue base maximises the number of 
available unique check symbols. 
• The larger the residue base, the larger the number of bits required to represent 
it and therefore the more complex is the self-checking checker required to 
perform comparison [Russe1l89J. 
• While residue coding can be applied to logical operations, the efficiency with 
which the technique can be employed depends heavily on the exact function to 
be checked. In the case of an ALU the prediction of output residues often 
requires correction by mediation circuitry [Sayers85,Russe1l89J. 
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2.4.2.2 Inseparable arithmetic codes 
Aritlunetic scaling of data can be used to calculate codes that are capable of error 
detection and correction [Brown60]. The codes, known as AN codes, are calculated 
using the fonn C = AN + B, where C is the codeword and A and B are constants with 
N being the original data. To allow negative numbers to be represented using AN 
. error-detecting codes, the multiplier (A) must be greater than 1 and odd [Brown60]. 
This provides codes separated by a minimum Hamming distance of 3. 
It was noted in [Avizienis71b] that while the value of B was non-zero, specific 
knowledge of the aritlunetic function being checked must be available. For example, 
for addition, the adder perfonns the function (Ai+B)+(Aj+B) = A(i+j) + 2B, where i 
and j are two operands. The validity of the result can be established by subtracting 2B 
and showing that the result is divisible by A. For further operations to be performed 
on the result, its code should be modified by subtracting B to obtain A(i+j) + B. 
However, B need only be non-zero when optimising the code to exhibit specific 
Hamming distances in excess of 3. If error detection abilities for up to 2 simultaneous 
bit errors is sufficient, the hardware overhead required to realise AN coding is 
therefore minimal. Consequently, this class of AN codes are known as low cost 
aritlunetic codes [Avizienis71 b]. AN codes are not suitable for checking logical 
operations [Brown60, Avizienis71b, Russe1l89, Siewiorek92]. 
2.4.3 Unidirectional Error Detecting Codes 
Unidirectional Error Detecting Codes (DEDs) are those codes that are designed 
specifically to detect unidirectional errors as described in section 2.2.1. UED codes 
can be sub-divided into three groups, namely: 
• Unordered UED codes 
• T-UED codes 
• Burst-UED codes 
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2.4.3.1 Unordered UED codes 
These codes exhibit the property that no codeword covers another in the same code 
set. Considering the relationship between two codes, X and Y: X is said to cover Y if 
X contains' 1 ' s in all positions in which Y contains' 1 ' s. Vnordered codes can be sub-
divided further into systematic and non-systematic codes [piestrak95]. 
Systematic unordered codes are formed by concatenating check bits and data to form 
a codeword. Systematic unordered codes are widely used for data transmission 
because they provide direct access to the message ( data) content. This eliminates the 
need to translate received codes prior to message processing. A class of codes known 
. as Berger codes has developed from an idea described in [Berger61] to exploit this 
characteristic. In Berger codes, which have been frequently reviewed, the checkbits 
are the inverse binary representation of the number of I' s in the data 
[Berger61 ,Frieman62,Ashjaee77 ,Pradhan80b,Smith84,Piestrak95]. This means that 
there must be enough checkbits to represent the maximum number of I's in the data 
word. If D represents the number of data bits and C the number of checkbits, then the 
condition, 2c_I = D describes a maximum length Berger code. Not all transmitted data 
sequences require the full data space offered by Berger codes. In [Smith84] the 
properties of the data itself were exploited to minimise the number of unique check-
symbols to be concatenated with the original data. This resulted in a more efficient 
coding but was specific for the data set employed. In [Ashjaee77] a technique for 
designing self-checking checkers (SCCs) for maximum length Berger codes was 
presented. Furthermore, an algorithm was developed which can process non-
maximum length Berger codes to make them suitable for checking using an SCC. 
Non-systematic unordered codes are typically weighted and in the case of m-out-of-n 
codes contain 'm' ones and 'n-m' zeros. They can detect all unidirectional errors (V-
errors) because any V-error changes the weight (the number of I's or O's) of the code. 
The code capacity, the number of possible codewords, for any m-out-of-n code was 
proven to be maximal when m=nl2 in [Frieman62]. Frieman also showed that for the 
same code capacity, the m-out-of-2m code is less redundant than Berger codes. M-
out-of-n codes can be validated by using either a counter or a self-checking checker as 
described in [Anderson73,Piestrak95]. 
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2.4.3.2 T-UED codes 
In modem processing systems, it is common that data is processed as parallel words. 
It is reasonable to assume that once an error has occurred it will probably occur again 
because of repeated use of the same hardware. T-ued codes rely on the assumption 
that data transmissions are built from the concatenation of parallel data words. These 
codes are designed to detect up to 't' unidirectional errors contained within single 
words. They are therefore inherently less redundant than generic UEDs which are 
capable of detecting all unidirectional errors . 
. The number of concurrent unidirectional errors that can be detected using Berger 
(systematic) codes is determined by the number of checkbits [Dong86]. However, 
only errors in the information bits can be guaranteed detectable [Dong86]. Dong 
codes are modified Berger codes where the original checkbits are replaced by their 
dual-rail code equivalent. This makes the checkbits in Dong codes immune from 
unidirectional error masking. Bose-Lin codes offer an alternative method of 
protecting checkbits. In [Bose85] two different methods for checkbit partitioning were 
presented with the aim of choosing the most efficient checkbit generation algorithm 
that would result in unordered codes. The detection abilities of these codes depend 
only on the number of checkbits used, and not on the number of information bits. The 
first method uses a partitioning of '2:r-2' bits using a l-out-of-2 code in the most 
significant 2 bits and the second partitioning scheme uses '4:r-4' bits with a 2-out-of-
4 code. Figure 2-1 shows both code structures. 
a) b) 
I INFORMATION I 2 I r-2 I 1r-I-NF-O-R-MA-r-IO-N--rI-4--rI-r--4 .... 1 
'-y-J '-y-J 
CHECK BITS CHECK BITS 
Figure 2-1 Bose-Lin codes: a) code type 1, b) code type II 
For values of r = 2, 3 and 6, code I is optimal because it can detect 2, 3 and 6 
unidirectional errors respectively. For other values of r, code II is more effective. In 
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[Jha87] a systematic t-ued code was presented for which the capabilities depend on 
the relationship between the number of information bits and the number of checkbits. 
Non-systematic t-UED codes were presented in [Borden82]. Borden codes are m-out-
of-n codes that conform to specific criteria enabling them to detect 't' concurrent 
unidirectional errors. To exhibit this characteristic, they are designed so that m = Lnl2J 
mod(t+ I), where 'm' and 'n' are used in the conventional sense [Borden86]. 
2.4.3.3 Burst-UED codes 
Efficient data coding can be achieved by combining multiple neighbouring data words 
into a block prior to coding [Grant89]. Burst-UED codes are capable of detecting 
bursts of errors spanning more than the length of a component data word. 
Bose codes are systematic codes where the checkbits represent the weight of the 
information bits and are interleaved with them [Bose86]. The R checkbits are 
positioned so that some information bits are placed between the most significant 
checkbit and the rest. The code structure is shown in Figure 2-2. 
R CHECK BITS 
,.......,.,..,INc:-FO::-::R--M-A---JI---O-N-,I'~1 INFORMATION ,Cb 
I '" ~I 21-1 Bits 
Figure 2-2 Bose code example. 
A burst error capable of just spanning the length of the interleaved information carmot 
simultaneously cause an error in the checkbits. Thus, burst-ueds affecting the 
checkbits are detected in addition to those affecting data bits. The concept of 
exploiting interleaved checkbits was developed further by Blaum in [Blaum88]. 
Like Bose codes, the check bits in Blaum codes combine to form a symbol that 
represents the weight of the information bits. Unlike Bose codes, check-symbols are 
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coded so that the ability to detect unidirectional errors is maximised. The component 
bits of each check-symbol are interleaved with infonnation bits to maintain the 
protective characteristics across the entire Blaum code. 
INFORMATION 
-!. -!. -!. -!. 
1000000001010000100111 10000111011 10000100110 
t t t t 
CHECKBITS 
Figure 2-3 Blaum code example. 
Figure 2-3 shows the fonnation of an example Blaum code. In the example, suppose 
that infonnation must be protected from a burst of up to 8 unidirectional errors 
[Blaum88]. This requires a minimum inter-symbol distance (between check-symbols) 
of 9 and can be achieved using 4 checkbits. To ensure that a burst of 8 or less 
unidirectional errors are detectable requires that 8 infonnation bits are placed between 
- each check symbol component. The Blaum code for the infonnation burst '00000000 
0000 I 00 I 0000 III 0 0000 I 00 I' requires a check symbol that represents a data weight 
of7 because there are 7 ones in the infonnation. The specific symbol may be '0110' 
and is combined with the infonnation bits in the way shown in Figure 2-3. 
Blaum codes have been shown capable of detecting burst errors of up to 2R.! bits 
where R is the number of check bits in the code [Blaum88]. As R increases, this error 
detecting ability becomes asymptotic to 2R. 
2.4.4 Summary ofInformation Redundant Techniques 
Like hardware redundancy, infonnation redundancy does not impose error latency. 
Furthennore, infonnation redundancy is attractive because a variety of coding 
techniques has been developed, each individually tailored to specific error models. 
This means that redundant infonnation can be minimised to suite the operating 
environment. 
Parity codes are simple and systematic, therefore incurring only a small complexity 
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, penalty, being fast to calculate and not requiring codeword translation. By 
maximising message length, the efficiency of word based codes offering a specific 
degree of protection is increased. Conversely, interlaced parity schemes increase 
overall immunity to an even number of bit errors. 
The check-base choice in arithmetic error detecting codes can significantly affect the 
complexity of the hardware implementation. Using either separable arithmetic codes 
or in-separable arithmetic codes, the best hardware efficiency is achieved when the 
total number of data symbols is exactly divisible by the number of check-symbols 
(modulus) [Avizienis71b]. In this case, where the codes are low cost codes, with 
check-base 2"_1, n is called the group length. According to Wakerly, low cost AN 
codes and inverse residue codes with a group length of 'n' can detect all 
unidirectional errors of weight less than 'n' [Wakerly75]. Therefore, as the modulus 
(residue base) increases, the error detecting ability rises correspondingly. Finally, both 
separable and in-separable arithmetic coding methods are poorly suited to the 
checking oflogical operations. 
The algorithmic error detecting codes presented have all been specifically developed 
with the goal of detecting unidirectional errors. For the situation where bursts of data 
are transmitted, the direct application of non-systematic codes has not been deemed 
appropriate. However, non-systematic coding has been successfully and beneficially 
applied to the coding of checkbits which themselves are separable from the data bits 
contained in bursts. 
Table 2-2 contains information extracted from the reviewed literature and summarises 
the properties of representative information redundant techniques. The suitability of 
information redundancy techniques to the communication and computation domains 
is contained within Table 2-2. The types of detectable errors are also included. 
The number of concurrent detectable errors is dependent on the inter-codeword 
Hamming distance. For AN codes the Hamming distance between codes depends on 
the the modulus. Dong codes are capable of detecting <100% of t-unidirectional 
errors [Dong84]. Dong codes are based on residue codes. As such, simultaneous 
errors are masked when their weight matches that of the residue modulus. As the 
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number of checkbits is increased, the number of possible occurrences is reduced for 
the same data width and thus the coverage becomes asymptotic to 100% [Dong84]. 
The abilities of Jha-Vora codes vary according to the ratio of checkbits to information 
bits, I. In some cases these codes were found superior to Bose-Lin codes [Jha87]. 
Domain Error Number of Checkers 
Detection concurrent errors TS(C),TS(T) 
Type detectable using R 
checkbits 
Parity Computation I Any single bit R~l: Any odd Hamming50( C), 
(even): Communication error number of errors Russe1l89(C) 
Word 
Parity Computation I Any single bit R -1 per group Any Fujiwara84(T), 
(even): Communication error odd number of Kakbaz84(T), 
Interlaced errors in a group Lo93(C) 
Residue Computation I Arithmetic, 100% - all mod(R) Kundu96(C), 
Communication Logical valued deviations Metra97(C) 
Inverse Computation I Arithmetic, 100% - all mod(R) Comparator: 
residue Communication Unidirectional deviations, 100% Lo93(C), 
Unidirectional Metra97(C) 
AN Computation Arithmetic (Hamming distance No 
-1) implied by 
multiplier 
M-of-N Communication Unidirectional 100% Reynolds78(C), 
Piestrak96b(T) 
Borden Communication t- 100%, m ~ Ln/2J Piestrak96a(T) 
(m-of-n) Unidirectional mod(e+l) 
, Symmetrical 
Berger Communication Unidirectional 100% Ashjaee77(C), 
Chang96(C), 
Metra96(T) 
Bose-Lin Communication t- Re{2,3}: R Bose85(C) 
(1) Unidirectional RS4: 2R.2 +R - 2 
Bose-Lin Communication t- ~5: 5.2"" Bose85(C) 
(2) Unidirectional +R-4 
Dong Communication t- <100% Dong84(C) 
Unidirectional 
Jha-Vora Communication t- ~5: better than Jha87(C) 
Unidirectional Bose-Lin (2) if 
2R::; I <1.42.2R 
Bose Communication Burst 2R-1 Bums92(C), 
Unidirectional Bose86(C) 
Blaum Communication Burst Re{2,3}: 2"-' Blaum88(C), 
Unidirectional ~4: > 2R-1 Piestrak95(T) 
Table 2-2 Properties of information redundant techniques. 
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The wide range of codes that have been developed necessitates the availability of a 
large number of different checker designs. If systems as a whole are to be trusted, the 
properties of the available checkers within them need to be established. Table 2-2 
includes references to suitable checking techniques that have been developed for code 
checking. In the checker column, the checker techniques are provided along with the 
appropriate properties, namely: totally self checking (TSC) and totally self testing 
(TST) given by C and T respectively. Where neither of these properties exist, the 
checker does not check its own integrity. 
2.5 TIME REDUNDANCY 
The main disadvantage of hardware redundant schemes is the general overhead in 
circuit complexity. Similarly, a disadvantage associated with information redundant 
schemes is the need to encode/decode data thus potentially incurring a hardware 
penalty associated with calculation. In addition to this direct hardware penalty comes 
. an increase in routing complexity and pin count needed for code transmission. Not all 
data processors require the continuous data throughput furnished by hardware 
redundancy and information redundancy [PateI82]. For such applications, where the 
metric of time is not fully exploited, the potential to provide reference data without 
the aforementioned drawbacks can be realised by using time redundancy. The time 
redundant techniques described are categorised within this review into three types 
namely those which incorporate functional re-mapping, those which incorporate 
functional partitioning and those based on duality. 
2.5.1 Functional Re-mapping 
Patel described a technique that allows efficient re-use of resources and yet provides a 
method for performing a calculation while furnishing an independent reference 
[PateI82, PateI83]. The technique was that of re-computing with shifted operands 
(RESO). During the first operation, the reference calculation is performed and the 
result stored. During the second operation, an equivalent calculation is performed 
using different paths through the same hardware structure as that used during the first 
operation. Figure 2-4 shows the concept of the approach. 
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step 1: X ----+I f Reg 
step 2: X f = Error signal 
Figure 2-4 Recomputing with shifted operands. 
In Figure 2-4, 'f represents the hardware common to each processing step. X is the 
data input during both processing steps. The function labelled 'c' is chosen such that 
the output of 'c' causes different paths to be sensitised within f during step 2 to those 
that were sensitised during step 1. 'C·l> is some function that compensates for the 
effects of 'C'. In [PateI82], the function 'C' was a shift function which was applied to 
an arithmetic logic unit while in [pateI83] it was applied to multiply and divide arrays. 
Extensions to this technique were presented in [Laha83] to identify faulty partitions in 
a multiplier array prior to the masking of their effects. 
In [Hana86] a variation of RESO was reported. ,The technique was that of re-
computing with swapped operands (RES WO) and like RESO makes use of different 
signal paths to provide answers to be compared. Firstly, conventional functional 
calculation is performed on the input values. Re-computation is subsequently 
performed on reconfigured hardware. The reconfigured hardware is organised such 
that the section previously used to calculate the most significant part of the answer is 
now used to recalculate the least significant part, and vice-versa. An alternative 
variant on the theme of RESO was presented by Li and Swarzlander in [Li92] where 
shifting was replaced by barrel shifting thus requiring less hardware (RERO). To be 
sure that no interference occurs between the most and least significant bits of the pre-
shifted operands, they are separated by the insertion of a zero. This requires an 
additional bitslice. These techniques are only applicable to iterative functions and are 
therefore not suited to Boolean operations. 
2.5.2 Functional Partitioning 
In [Johnson88] the application of a technique was described for performing a 
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calculation by combining the partial products resulting from two calculation steps 
(RESWOIDWC). In the example provided, a 32-bit adder, addition of the two least 
significant 16 bit words is performed twice in parallel during the first computation 
step. This allows immediate comparison of results. Following comparison, one of the 
results is stored in a register along with the overflow, and then the additions of the 
most significant 16 bit words are performed in parallel. The final answer is made up 
of the current adder outputs and the stored result. This technique while exhibiting time 
redundancy exhibits error latency typical of hardware or information redundancy due 
to the ability to perform checking following each processing step. However, this 
technique, like those based on RESO is only suitable for application to iterative 
designs because it relies on duplicate functionality between bitslices. 
2.5.3 Duality 
In [Shedletsky78] the technique of alternate data-retry was introduced as a method of 
fault masking. This technique requires that data be represented by codes. Furthermore, 
two codes, the bitwise complement of each other, exist for each data value. By 
checking the validity of received codes, a re-transmission can be requested using the 
alternate code for the last data sent. Assuming the single stuck-at fault model, the re-
transmission is guaranteed to mask any single bit error. In [Reynolds78] a technique 
specifically targeted at error detection using self-duals was proposed. As in 
[Shedletsky78], functions are designed such that h(X)",;; (X), if X is the input data set 
to the function. Computations are performed twice: once where the original data is 
supplied to the function inputs, and once where the bitwise complement is supplied. 
By combining the successive outputs, a dual-rail code is formed under fault-free 
conditions. It is important to ensure that the same computational path is not used 
during successive repetitive computations otherwise fault masking may occur 
[Shedletsky78, Reynolds78]. In the case of logical functions, this constraint may lead 
to a complexity increase in excess of 100%. 
2.5.4 Summary of Time Redundancy Techniques 
Time redundant techniques exploit the metric of time as an alternative mechanism to 
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hardware or infonnation redundant techniques. The properties associated with time 
redundant techniques were obtained from the literature and are presented in Table 2-3. 
Design Data Error Error Complexity 
Style Throughput Coverage Latency ('C' means 
I 
(conventional conventional) 
= 100%) 
Alternating Any 50% S; 100% 1 S; (2C + 
Logic Comparator + 
Double 
storage) 
Alternate Any 50-100% - 1 S;2C+ 
Data Retry Comparator 
RESO Iterative 50% 100% 1 (C+Shift)/C + 
Array Comparator 
RESWO Iterative 50% 100% 1 C+ 
Array Comparator 
RERO Iterative 50% 100% 1 (C+1)/C + 
Array Comparator 
RESWOI Iterative 50% 100% s;1 =1.7 C 
DWC Array 
(REDWC) 
Table 2-3 Properties a/time redundant techniques. 
With the exception of Alternating logic, the techniques specifically designed with the 
purpose of error detection all exhibit error coverage of 100% for single errors 
occurring in either the reference or calculation. In the case of Alternating Logic, the 
structure of the circuitry used to realise a self-dual function influences the maximum 
error coverage. The error coverage characteristics for Alternate Data-Retry were not 
encountered in the reviewed literature. 
Time redundant techniques generally offer a potentially lower hardware penalty than 
hardware redundant techniques. Furthennore, recently developed time redundancy 
techniques remove the necessity to increase the data bus width between processing 
. blocks with respect to their conventional counterparts. Therefore, for systems that 
contain blocks that do not need to compute during each clock cycle, time redundancy 
techniques may prove to be useful. For safety critical applications, most time 
redundancy techniques exhibit unacceptably high error latency. 
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2.6 ANALYSIS OF REVIEW 
A restriction that influences the suitability of certain time redundantlhardware 
redundant techniques for adoption in IFIS is the lack of support for generic functions. 
For example, re-computation with swapped (or rotated) operands requires identical 
functionality between neighbouring bits within the datapath. This is not to be 
expected in the case of a decoder. Additionally, techniques of hardware redundancy 
and time redundancy have been found only to provide information that supports 
dynamic testing of computation, while information redundancy provides techniques 
for both computation and communication. 
This information has resulted in the ability to exclude techniques that are not suitable 
for adoption within IFIS. Further conclusions can be drawn by closer examination of 
the remaining reviewed techniques with respect to the characteristics directly related 
to communication and computation. 
2.6.1 Coding between Computation Elements 
Table 2-4 shows the information redundant techniques that are applicable to data 
communication. An important consideration when choosing a coding technique is the 
ease with which a code can be built and checked in addition to the rate at which the 
data can be extracted for subsequent calculation. This is related to the hardware 
required to calculate and check the code and the ability to access the data contained in 
the code. Clearly, codes requiring ROMs and counters (sequential logic) are more 
difficult to calculate and check than those built using combinational techniques. 
Similarly, separable codes permit concurrent data access and code checking. 
The failure types for which IFIS is intended were identified as unidirectional errors 
and those resulting from stuck-openlbridging (combinational/sequential) faults. IFIS 
was additionally specified to use encoding that supports modular checker design. 
Based on the above discussion, only bitwise even parity coding or l-out-of-2 coding 
can be built/checked fast while also supporting modular checker design. Both result in 
100% information redundancy forming a dual-rail code. 
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Encoding Failure Type Supports Modular 
Method / Type Checker Design 
Parity (even): Xor/Separable Any single bit error No 
Word 
Parity (even): Xor/Separable Any single bit error Bitwise 
Interlaced 
Residue Coder/Separable Arithmetic No 
Inverse Residue Coder/Separable Arithmetic, No 
Unidirectional 
M-of-N ROM/ Unidirectional l-of-2 
Inseparable 
Borden ROMl t-Unidirectional, No 
(m-of-n) Inseparable Symmetrical 
Berger Counter/ Unidirectional No 
Separable 
Bose-Lin (1) Counter or t-Unidirectional No 
adder tree / 
Separable 
Bose-LiD (2) Counter or t-Unidirectional No 
adder tree / 
Separable 
DODg Separable t-Unidirectional No 
Jha-Vora Counter + ROM t-Unidirectional No 
/ Separable 
Bose Counter or Burst No 
adder tree / Unidirectional 
Separable 
B1aum Counter + ROM Burst No 
/ Separable Unidirectional 
Table 2-4 Properties of codes suitable for communication 
Bitwise odd parity dual-rail codes detect unidirectional errors because unidirectional 
errors result in even parity (non-codewords). However, the even parity scheme cannot 
detect unidirectional errors because they result in incorrect codewords. 
Data coding alone is insufficient to guarantee the detection of errors resulting from 
stuck-open or bridging faults because they typically affect the time taken for a correct 
value to occur. To detect them requires checking for corrupt data at specific points in 
time. To ensure that the codes currently appearing at checker inputs are up-to-date 
requires the ability to differentiate between successive sets of codewords. 
An example of such a scheme is where consecutive dual-rail codewords exhibit 
alternating parity, thus ensuring monotonic transitions. Monotonic transition 
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checking, in the form of dual-rail return-to-zero coding, was proposed to provide on-
line testing in [J ones91]. However, the scheme was not characterised in this context. 
Additionally, saturated (four-phase) dual-rail coding schemes (where all codes carry 
data) have been employed to co-ordinate computation within asynchronous designs by 
using monotonic code transitions to signal completion detection [Linder96,David92, 
Dean91]. The advantages of applying such coding schemes to on-line testing are that: 
• Successive sets of codewords can be distinguished by alternating parity. 
• Single errors are detected by the appropriate parity code-set. These may result 
from combinational (temporary) faults or from sequential faults. 
• Unidirectional errors (more than one bit) lasting more than one processing 
cycle enforce fixed (even) parity, thus being detected by the inability to 
assume odd parity. 
2.6.2 Design Techniques for Computation 
IFIS computation elements accept and compute communication codes. The data 
content of input codes is operated upon to generate the data content of output codes. 
The IFIS communication codes can be computed in one of the following ways: 
• As a direct result of data computation. 
• Following data computation and based on its validity. 
If communication codes are to be generated as a direct result of data computation the 
computation circuit should generate outputs that are similar to those required to 
protect communication. If the outputs generated directly from data computation are 
not similar to those required, then a complex mapping function may be required. 
Alternatively, communication code generation may be performed based on the 
validity of data computation. Vaiid IFIS codes are assigned to IFIS cell outputs if data 
computation is verified. Otherwise, invalid IFIS codes are assigned. Table 2-5 shows 
the on-line test techniques from those reviewed that are specifically targeted at 
facilitating error detection within the computation domain. 
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Data Rate Failure Type Dual-rail 
Compatibility 
DWC 100% Alllogical errors Inherent 
(duplication) 
Residue 100% Arithmetic Not Inherent 
Inverse Residue 100% Arithmetic / Not Inherent 
Unidirectional 
Alternating Logic 50% Alllogical errors Inherent 
(duplication) 
Table 2-5 Properties of computation techniques that can be applied to any digital junction. 
Duplication with comparison (DWC) and alternating logic both compare duplicate 
data thus, they can reasonably be expected to be compatible to dual-rail coding. 
However, residue codes rely on a representation of data that requires translation 
before direct comparisons can be made. These techniques are therefore not expected 
to be directly compatible to dual-rail code generation. 
2.6.3 Areas Open to Research within the Context ofIFIS. 
IFIS designs exhibit strong similarities to those asynchronous systems that use dual-
rail codes. However, saturated dual-rail coding schemes do not appear to have been 
applied to on-line testing. Furthermore, the properties associated with the dual-rail 
return-to-zero code proposed in the original IFIS patent were not characterised 
[Jones91]. The lack of available information regarding such applications suggests that 
the application of dual-rail code sequences to on-line testing warrants attention. 
Having identified dual-rail coding coupled to a sequential protocol as candidates 
. worthy of investigation, circuit structures that support their implementation should 
also be investigated. In section 2.6.2, it was highlighted that no quantitative 
information is available regarding the suitability of specific redundancy techniques to 
support the generation of dual-rail code sequences. To quantify the characteristics of 
the selected redundancy techniques to dual-rail code generation, requires further 
investigation. 
By investigating both of the specified areas, the direct and indirect influences of 
coding and protocol on IFIS system characteristics can be quantified. 
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OVERVIEW OF INVESTIGATIONS 
3.1 OBJECTIVES OF CHAPTER 
The objectives of this chapter are to select and introduce the investigations contained 
within this thesis. More specifically, the objectives are to: 
• Provide a statement of research objectives 
• Present the status of the IFIS design methodology prior to this research 
• Introduce the proposed investigations 
3.2 OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH 
This thesis focuses on the IFIS on-line test methodology. More specifically, this thesis 
provides an assessment of different aspects of the methodology and offers evidence as 
to its suitability for application to on-line testable systems. 
3.2.1 Identification of Research Topics 
Chapter I identified the possibility to perform failure diagnosis in IFIS systems based 
on the halting sequence ofIFIS system outputs. 
Chapter 2 highlighted the need to investigate the implications of using dual-rail code 
sequences to provide on-line testing. The specific coding schemes that were identified 
were saturated-four-phase coding and return-to-zero coding. These schemes exhibit 
the common feature that consecutive codewords are distinguishable. To support this 
feature, transitions must conform to a suitable protocol. 
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3.2.2 Statement of Research Objectives 
This thesis aims to understand the impact of the IFIS on-line test methodology on 
system design. The following objectives have been identified to enable an assessment 
to be achieved: 
• To quantify the restrictions on performance and test coverage imposed by 
different dual-rail coding and protocol schemes and select a suitable 
combination for IFIS. 
• To assess the characteristics of test coverage, complexity and performance 
associated with different circuit design techniques used to implement the 
chosen IFIS coding scheme and protocol. 
• To characterise a demonstration IFIS system that incorporates multiple 
computation elements that are interconnected such that the IFIS protocol is 
enforced. 
• To quantify the diagnostic resolution attainable based only on the halting 
sequence of primary system outputs following error detection. 
The issues relating to test coverage, complexity" and performance are all issues that 
directly influence the potential future use of the IFIS methodology. 
Failure diagnosis is important because it can be used to assist in the repair of 
repairable systems, thus reducing or eliminating system outage. Furthermore, it can be 
used to identify weak-points in design, thus permitting preventive measures to be used 
in future implementations. If the inherent diagnostic ability of IFIS systems is 
sufficient to facilitate system repair, then IFIS designs may increase system 
availability because diagnosis occurs during system shutdown rather than afterwards. 
, 
3.3 STATUS OFTHE IFIS METHODOLOGY 
IFIS (If it Fails It Stops) is currently under investigation at Loughborough University 
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and is the subject of the investigations contained in this thesis. The status of IFIS at 
the beginning of this research is sununarised below. 
A patent was issued in 1991 describing the concept of applying asynchronous 
communication techniques in the on-line testing environment [Jones91]. This patent 
specified that coding be employed to carry data and cell status information. 
System level modelling was needed to explore the data throughput and halting 
properties associated with combinations of different dual-rail coding schemes and 
inelastic/elastic protocols. This motivated a group effort to generate behavioural 
VHDL models for IFIS processing elements. At that time, the potential implications 
of protocol, encoding and processing element structure on testability, performance or 
halting behaviour had not been quantified. Furthermore, the identification of the 
potential to use halting sequence as a means of failure diagnosis had not occurred. 
3.4 INTRODUCTION TO INVESTIGATIONS 
This section introduces each investigation, detailing the issues to be addressed and the 
approaches applied to answer them. 
3.4.1 Selecting a Version ofIFIS: The Influences of Data Coding and Protocol 
The behavioural specification of the IFIS design methodology is influenced by the 
halting mechanism itself. This influence stems from the requirement to ensure error 
containment: a task passed to external circuitry following the recognition of an error 
by detection circuitry in conventional systems. The objectives of this investigation are 
to: 
• Introduce the requirements of designs implemented using an on-line test 
methodology which uses halting as a mechanism for error flagging and data 
management. 
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• Understand the potential influences of data coding and protocol on the 
testability, behaviour and performance ofIFIS designs. 
• Select the combination of data coding and protocol that exhibits the most 
attractive attributes. 
This investigation examines the properties associated with different coding techniques 
and protocols. IFIS has already been defined to use dual-rail coding where two rails 
are used to encode each information bit. The exact dual-rail code employed can affect 
the following: 
• Data throughput rate 
• The code space 
The data rate influences the attractiveness of the design methodology when 
considering it as a candidate for adoption in future designs. The code space restricts 
the range of vectors that can be applied to processing elements and thus may limit the 
ability to stimulate fault sites within them. 
The protocol controls the activity of processing elements. The choice of protocol to be 
adopted can affect: 
• The data throughput rate 
• The code space 
• The behaviour 
The behaviour ofIFIS systems under normal operating conditions depends on the type 
of protocol used, while the behaviour following fault-conditions also depends on the 
selection of protocol monitoring points. 
This investigation examines dual-rail code and protocol combinations in the above 
context and identifies a suitable combination to apply to future IFIS designs. 
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3.4.2 IFIS Cell Design 
The structure of designs is known to affect the properties associated with them. 
Within the context of design-for-test, circuit structure is tailored to provide the most 
acceptable combination of test coverage and hardware penalty for the specific 
application. The objectives of this investigation are to: 
• Understand the influence of applying different design techniques to the 
generation of reference information and verification/error management 
circuitry within IFIS processing elements. 
• Select that structure which provides the best features in the context of IFIS 
on-line testable systems. The selected structure will then be adopted as a 
template for future designs. 
This investigation examines the influence of the circuit structure applied to IFIS 
processing elements on the following: 
• Testability 
• Data throughput 
• Complexity 
These attributes were chosen because they are those which are commonly used to 
distinguish between design-for-test techniques. Cell partitioning is considered and a 
number of alternative structures that were described in the review are applied to 
processing element sub-blocks. The options, together with alternative proposals are 
quantitatively compared and a generic IFIS processing element architecture is 
developed. 
3.4.3 IFIS Feasibility Study 
The previous two investigations independently addressed issues related to the IFIS 
processing elements and the connections/communications between them. The 
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feasibility study aims to: 
• Report the application of IFIS to a real-world design implemented in 
hardware. 
• Outline the design experiences associated with designing using IFIS. 
• Demonstrate the operation of the circuit both in fault-free mode and with a 
specific failure. 
• Compare the performance, complexity and fault coverage of the conventional 
and IFIS equivalent implementations. This empirically quantifies the 
characteristics of a combined system built upon the results of the previous 
two investigations. 
The feasibility study exploits the results obtained from the previous two investigations 
and applies them to the re-design of a commercial UART. The UART was considered 
to be a representative design because it includes busses, state machines and registers, 
all of which are frequently used design elements. 
To assess the effectiveness of the methodology a comparison is made between a 
conventional UART and its IFIS equivalent implementation on FPGA. The UART 
represents one of the most complex designs using a single on-line test technique to 
date. Output traces are shown for the IFIS implementation on FPGA operating under 
fault-free conditions and with deliberate failures injected. Comparisons of size and 
speed are presented in addition to an indication of on-line test coverage. 
3.4.4 Failure Diagnosis iu IFIS 
This investigation presents and assesses a failure diagnosis technique that exploits the 
halting properties associated with IFIS designs. The aims of this investigation are to: 
• Develop a strategy that is appropriate for performing failure diagnosis in 
designs that have been implemented using the IFIS on-line test methodology. 
• Describe the fault models that are to be applied to IFIS designs. 
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• Identify a relationship between the behaviour of models to simplify 
algorithmic diagnosis. 
• Show that the technique is suitable for automation by presenting algorithmic 
approaches to failure diagnosis in IFIS. 
• Compare and select the most efficient algorithm for future use. 
• Present the failure-diagnosis view of the experimental vehicle. 
• Perform failure diagnosis on the experimental vehicle under a variety of fault 
conditions. 
• Assess the diagnosis technique within the context of the investigation . 
With the aim of developing an efficient method of failure diagnosis for use with IFIS 
. designs, the essential capabilities required to perform failure diagnosis are identified. 
The facilities inherent in IFIS designs are identified and described within the context 
offailure diagnosis. 
Having established which properties are provided by IFIS it remains to develop a 
complementary technique that provides the missing attributes required to perform 
. 
fault diagnosis. A technique for fault diagnosis is proposed that exploits the halting 
properties associated with IFIS designs. 
Based on the logical feedback structure of IFIS cells, logical fault sites with differing 
halting effects are identified with respect to the cell structure to form an expanded 
fault list. Algorithms are presented which' can generate dictionaries for different 
logical fault sites (fault classes). The performance of these algorithms is compared and 
one is selected for application to the UART used in the feasibility study under 
different injected fault conditions. 
The individual faults that can be injected in the IFIS UART and the effects of 
combining them to emulate other fault conditions are described. Failure diagnosis is 
performed on the IFIS UART containing a number of different injected fault 
conditions .. The ability to distinguish between single occurrences of the extended fault 
list is quantified empirically. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SELECTING A VERSION OF IFIS 
4.1 OBJECTIVES OF CHAPTER 
The behavioural specification of the IFIS design methodology is influenced by the 
halting mechanism itself. This influence stems from the requirement to ensure error 
containment: a task passed to external circuitry following the recognition of an error 
by detection circuitry in conventional systems. The objectives of this investigation are 
to: 
• Introduce the requirements of designs implemented using an on-line test 
. methodology which uses halting as a mechanism for error flagging and 
data management. 
• Understand the potential influences of data coding and protocol on the 
testability, behaviour and performance ofIFIS designs. 
• Select the combination of data coding and protocol which exhibits the 
most attractive attributes. 
4.2 INTRODUCTION 
IPIS (If it Fails It Stops) is an on-line test methodology that uses halting as a 
mechanism to provide on-line test features [Jones91]. The halting mechanism is 
provided by a protocol that permits/prohibits data flow according to the validity of 
received data. The data is coded to provide the necessary information for validation 
according to the protocol. It was suggested that dual-rail coding be the technique 
applied to IFIS in [Jones91]. To assess the implications of employing different coding 
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and protocol techniques, the expectations oflFIS in the context of on-line testing must 
be defined. Forany on-line test methodology, the following attributes are important: 
• Behaviour under fault-free and faulty conditions 
• The on-line test coverage 
• The performance and complexity 
The behaviour ofIFIS designs must be such that the inherent error management only 
permits correct (uncorrupted) data to propagate. The implications of this statement are 
that IFIS must detect incorrect data, prevent the incorrect data from propagating and 
prevent future data propagation. The permanency of halting is necessary because it is 
not only the validity of data at any single point in time that is important, but also the 
validity of the complete data burst. If corrupted data were removed from a data burst, 
the received data burst would be different in length from the transmitted burst and 
must therefore be corrupt. 
In addition to the behaviour of designs under faulty and fault-free conditions, it is 
important that the IFIS on-line test methodology be capable of checking a high 
proportion of the design during normal operation. In the context of off-line testing, the 
measure of quality applied to a test vector set is the test coverage. The test coverage of 
a vector set refers to the percentage of modelled faults that are detectable for a specific 
design when the vector set is applied. Similarly, on-line test coverage is intended to be 
a measure of the ability to detect modelled faults. Unlike the off-line test environment, 
the test vector set is neither constrained in size nor data content. However, the data in 
IFIS is coded to permit protocol checking. The data coding therefore restricts the 
range of vectors that can be applied to IFIS processing elements and may limit the 
maximum on-line test coverage. 
As with any other design methodology, maximal data throughput, minimal 
complexity overhead and maximal ease of implementation are all factors that affect 
the attraction of the methodology to potential users. 
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This investigation examines dual-rail code and protocol combinations in the above 
context and identifies a suitable combination to apply to future IFIS designs. 
4.3 CODING 
When transmitting messages from one location to another, the message is built from a 
sequence of symbols (or codewords). These symbols are decoded upon message 
reception to extract the original data content. Multi-rail encoding schemes supplement 
data with additional information that can be used to provide completion detection (to 
distinguish between symbols) in an asynchronous environment or endow error checking 
in a test environment. The haltabiIity and error propagating characteristics of 
asynchronous circuits were reported by Varshavsky in [Varshavsky86]. 
Dual-rail coding is one implementation of the general set of multi-rail encoding schemes 
and is well established. IFIS has already been defined to use dual-rail coding, where two 
rails are used to encode each information bit, to carry data and status information 
between cells. The exact dual-rail code employed can affect the following: 
• Data throughput rate 
• The code space 
The data rate influences the attractiveness of the design methodology when 
considering it as a candidate for adoption in future designs. The code space restricts 
the range of vectors that can be applied to processing elements and thus may limit the 
ability to stimulate fault sites within them. Two dual-rail coding schemes which are 
commonly applied to asynchronous systems were selected for examination namely, 
return-to-zero coding and saturated coding. 
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4.3.1 Return to Zero Coding 
Return-to-zero (RTZ) coding is widely used in telecommunications systems. Within 
the domain of integrated circuit engineering, Mead and Conway introduced it as a 
means of delivering sequence information within asynchronous circuits [Mead80]. 
Figure 4-1 shows the state transition diagrams for the conventional binary coding 
scheme and the RTZ coding scheme. The binary coding scheme is not suitable for 
providing completion detection or error detection because it does not possess sufficient 
code space to permit representation of data and supplementary information. In binary 
systems, there are no constraints on state transitions, i.e. a '0' can be followed by a '0'. To 
ensure that codes representing data and error status within IFIS designs are current, 
successive code states must be distinguishable. 
Binary 
C1~Q')) 
DATA 
STATE 
DATA 
STATE 
DATA 
STATE 
Return-To-Zero 
TOKEN 
STATE 
DATA 
STATE 
o 
ILLEGAL 
STATE 
Figure 4-1 State transition diagrams/or Binary and Return-ta-zero systems. 
In the RTZ coding scheme shown in Figure 4-1 data is supplemented with additional 
information by increasing the code space. The code space is increased to include a 
spacer that enables transitions to be observed between data states of identical value. 
Only those transitions shown in the (RTZ) state diagram are considered error-free. 
Figure 4-1 shows that self-transitions are prohibited when using such schemes. 
The maximum data transfer rate associated with RTZ coding is restricted because not 
all symbols carry useful data. When implemented using binary logic levels, the RTZ 
scheme requires two rails to encode the three states, namely: data state 0, data state 1 
and the spacer. This results in a spare (illegal) state. 
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4.3.2 Saturated Four Phase Coding 
Saturated-four-phase dual-rail coding was used to provide completion detection in 
asynchronous designs in [Dean91, David92, Linder96]. 
Figure 4-2 shows the state transition diagram for a saturated dual-rail coding scheme. 
As with the RTZ coding scheme described in section 4.3.1, self-transitions are not 
permitted. Comparison with Figure 4-1 reveals that the illegal state and spacer 
associated with the RTZ scheme have been replaced by alternative data states. 
DATA 
STATE 
'0' 
ALTERNATIVE 
DATA 
STATE '0' 
ALTERNATIVE 
DATA 
STATE '1' 
DATA 
STATE 
'1 ' 
Figure 4-2 State transition diagram/or saturated coding scheme. 
This saturated coding scheme maximises the capacity of the code because each state is 
a data carrying state. Thus the data rate is the same as the symbol rate. Figure 4-2 
shows that two codes represent each data value (0 and I) and yet transitions between 
states are still constrained. This type of saturated coding scheme was employed to 
encode data in an asynchronous environment in [Dean91]. 
4.3.3 Application of Codes to IFIS 
As specified in section 4.3.1 transitions between successive codes must be verifiable. 
The following options for verification have been identified: 
• Translate the codes appearing at the processing elements into state labels 
and verify the state sequence. 
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• Choose codes such that an easily identifiable relationship between 
successive codes exists. 
Code translation could be perfonned and valid state neighbours identified from the 
previous state using a dictionary. While this is an option, it is complex and therefore 
not attractive for such a fundamental process. 
Identification of a relationship between successive codes revealed that the same dual-
rail code representation used to provide completion detection in asynchronous designs 
could be adopted for error detection. The particular dual-rail coding scheme ensures 
that only monotonic transitions occur when adhering to a valid state sequence. Two 
advantages of this option are: . 
• The code used exhibits closure and is therefore suitable for the saturated 
scheme in addition to the RTZ scheme. 
• Transitions can be easily checked based on the alternating parity of 
successive codes. 
Table 4-1 relates the dual-rail code representations and meanings in the context of the 
RTZ coding scheme and in the context of the saturated coding scheme. The dual-rail 
code is carried on a pair of single-bit signals, nominally labelled t and f. An asterisk 
denotes the alternative data states, as shown in Figure 4-2. 
Bit't' Bit'r RTZCode Saturated 
Name Code Name 
0 1 0 0* 
0 0 Spacer 0 
1 0 1 1* 
1 1 Illegal 1 
Table 4-1 Dual-rail codes and their meanings. 
In Table 4-1 the rows have been arranged such that neighbouring rows represent valid 
neighbours in both the RTZ and saturated coding schemes described in section 4.3.1 and 
section 4.3.2. 
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Considering that the codes are carried by signal lines, the effect of a logic-affecting fault 
occurring on one of those signal lines is to change the possible transitions between 
states. For example, considering the saturated coding shown in Table 4-1 in conjunction 
with Figure 4-2, a stuck-at-l on the t line will make it impossible to represent 0 or 0*. 
Thus the arcs from state 1 * to state 0 and from state 1 to 0*, shown in Figure 4-2, are 
removed. Hence if the last state received by a circuit element was 1 (1*) and an 
upstream element is attempting to write a 0* (0) on the faulty lines, that transition will 
never complete. As a result, the receiving element therefore does not process. 
4.4 PROTOCOL 
Received data codes are verified for adherence to the protocol that in turn controls the 
activity of processing elements. The choice of protocol to be adopted can affect: 
• The data throughput rate 
• The code space 
• The behaviour 
The behaviour ofIFIS systems under normal operating conditions depends on the type 
of protocol used, while the behaviour following fault-conditions also depends on the 
selection of protocol monitoring points. Protocols can be partitioned into elastic 
protocols and inelastic protocols. The fundamental concepts of these categories are 
described. 
4.4.1 Elastic Pipelines 
Elastic pipelines are those formed by the interconnection of asynchronous processing 
elements as described in [Sutherland89]. Figure 4-3 shows the interconnection of 
processing elements to form a generic pipeline structure combining actual data with 
data control signals, as is the case where dual-rail encoding is employed. The heavy 
arrows, from left to right, represent data flow, while the lighter arrows, right to left, 
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represent feedback. Two phase handshaking can be performed using a dual-rail 
encoding scheme by treating data-flow states as a source of requests and feedbacks as 
a source of acknowledgements . 
... 
L. 
-> L 
... A ... B ... C ... ... ~ ,.. ~ 
Figure 4-3 Interconnection ojprocessing elements 'A: 'B' and 'C'jorming a pipeline. 
An elastic pipeline is a variable depth symbol buffer. The pipeline can contain a 
variable number of symbols between the minimum symbol buffer depth and the 
maximum symbol buffer depth, the latter state being that of saturation. 
The number of symbols held in the pipeline is dependent on the rates of symbol 
supply and removal. If the removal rate is lower than the supply rate, eventually the 
pipeline becomes saturated thus limiting the supply rate to be the same as the removal 
rate. 
If the removal rate is faster than the supply rate, the contents of the pipeline eventually 
reach a minimum. In this situation, all elements contain a function of a copy of the last 
symbol supplied to the pipeline. For example, if each of the elements shown in Figure 4-
3 act only as temporary storage, then all elements in the pipeline contain a copy of the 
last symbol supplied to element A. As soon as a new symbol is supplied, it progresses 
through the complete pipeline and appears at C, leaving each element in the pipeline 
containing a copy of the symbol. 
Figure 4-4 shows the sequence of events that might occur in an elastic pipeline. For 
the sake of generality, two symbol types are shown. Symbol type 1 represents the 
data state 0 or 1. Symbol type 2 represents the token state (spacer) for the RTZ coding 
scheme and represents the alternative data state for 1 or 0 for the saturated coding 
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scheme. As was the case in Figure 4-3, conventional data (symbol) flow is from left to 
right, while feedback, described above, flows from right to left. 
In Figure. 4-4, i) shows a stable saturated state; meaning that none of the processing 
elements A, B or C can process symbols. According to the elastic protocol, the 
pipeline cannot accept new symbols until a symbol is removed downstream. 
Therefore, this state remains until a change on the feedback input to cell C occurs as a 
result of downstream symbol removal. ii) As soon as data changes on the feedback 
supplying element C, the protocol condition for the element is satisfied, thus allowing 
a new element output to occur in step iii). Step iv) shows that element B has now 
processed as a result of step iii), thus allowing element A to process during the next 
clock cycle. This results in the state shown in step v). 
I) KEY 
Data-flow ---+ 
Feed-back _ 
E _ SYMBOl TYPE 1 
11) o _ SYMBOL TYPE 2 
Ill) 
Iv) 
Figure 4-4 Data movement in an elastic pipeline. i) the stable state, ii) a change on the 
feedback input to cell C at time O. iii) new output of cell C one clock cycle later at time 1. 
ivY at time 2 the output of cell B has changed v) the next stable state. 
Examination of Figure 4-4 as a whole, shows that symbols are copied (processed) by 
the immediate neighbouring downstream element before being overwritten by an 
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upstream neighbour. For example, the symbol held in element B is copied to element 
C during step iii prior to being overwritten by a copy of the symbol held in element A 
during step iv. This is characteristic of elastic pipelines. 
It may be noticed that during step iii it would have been possible to change the data 
applied to the feedback to element C. This is what would happen if data was 
continually removed from the pipeline. By repeating steps iv and v while also 
updating the feedback input to element C once every two clock cycles, the maximum 
symbol rate of one element per two processing cycles is achieved. 
4.4.2 Inelastic Pipelines 
Inelastic pipelines contain a constant number of symbols. This is because symbols 
move in lock-step throughout the pipeline. As a symbol appears at the output of the 
pipeline, so a new symbol must appear at the input to the pipeline. Symbols are not 
duplicated within inelastic pipelines. 
I) 
·4 ·4 
11) 
·4 ·4 
KEY 
Data-flow ~ 
Feed-back +--
E - SYMBOl. TYPE 1 
o - SYMBOL TYPE 2 
Ill) E 
Figure 4-5 Data movement in an inelastic pipeline. i) the pipeline at any nominal time t . 
. ii) the state of the pipeline at t+ 1. iii) the state of the pipeline at t+ 2. 
The inelastic protocol requires that the quantity of data held in the pipeline remains 
constant. For this reason, data is supplied to the pipeline at one end while data is 
simultaneously removed from the other. As a result, the data held within the pipeline 
progresses from left to right at the rate of one cell per clock cycle. 
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4.4.3 Application of Protocols to IFIS 
Figure 4-3 shows a generic pipeline that allows bi-directional transfer of infonnation 
between neighbouring processing elements. In the asynchronous environment, the 
infonnation is used to control data flow based on the readiness of downstream 
processing elements to receive new data. However, in the IFIS environment, the 
infonnation is used to control data flow based on its validity as interpreted by the 
current processing element. 
Prior to code validation in IFIS, time must be allowed for codes to stabilise. This 
necessity is eliminated in the asynchronous environment because precautions are 
taken to avoid race hazards, thus eliminating intennediate values from occurring 
during transitions. The precautions taken in asynchronous designs are often costly in 
tenns of complexity and should be avoided if possible. 
The need to avoid the occurrence of intennediate code transitions in IFIS designs is 
C' eliminated by ensuring that validation only occurs following a predetennined passing 
of time. IFIS designs are synchronous and therefore all internal states are expected to 
have stabilised prior to consecutive active clock edges. Validation is therefore applied 
only to codes that have been stored in synchronous registers. 
4.5 BEHAVIOUR OF ALTERNATIVE IFIS VERSIONS 
The dual-rail protocols used in asynchronous designs are designed to allow processing 
elements to resume processing as soon as specific requirements have been fulfilled. 
The selection of nodes that are monitored to provide handshaking in IFIS can 
influence the behaviour following the occurrence of a fault condition. The nodes 
conventionally monitored in asynchronous designs are used as a basis for the protocol 
in IFIS designs and the resultant halting behaviour is compared against the 
requirement described in section 4.2. A new protocol is proposed and its behavioural 
attributes are verified. 
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4.5.1 Existing Protocol Conditions 
Figure 4-6 shows three neighbouring cells within an IFIS pipeline. As was the case in 
Figure 4-3, data flow is from left to right while feedback is from right to left. All cell 
inputs appear on the left hand side cif each cell while cell outputs appear on the right. 
The current cell refers to any cell that is currently under examination within the 
pipeline. In Figure 4-6 it is apparent that the current cell monitors the predecessor 
and successor cells by means of their data and feedback connections respectively. 
Predessessor Current Successor 
~ .. ~ 
. t t t Clock 
Figure 4-6 Neighbouring elements within an IFIS pipeline. 
The activation of the current cell depends on the compliance of the monitored outputs 
to the protocol. 
4.5.1.1 General behaviour 
The behaviour of the current cell can be described in the following way: 
Iff (the protocol condition is satisfied) 
then 
the next cell output = f( current input) 
else 
the next cell output = the current cell output 
The protocol condition depends on the coding scheme and the type of pipeline 
employed. According to the discussion in section 4.3.3 the codes presented in Table 4c 
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1 can be classified into code sets such that codes of equal parity are placed in the same 
set. For clarity, this classification is presented in Table 4-2. 
Generic Label RTZCoding Saturated Coding 
Scheme Scheme 
Set 0 {O,l} {O,l } 
Set 1 {spacer} {O*,l *} 
Table 4-2 Code classification. 
Considering that the union of Set 0 and Set 1 within a specific coding scheme 
-
represents all codewords in that scheme, then let the union of Set x and Set x 
represent all codewords in that scheme. 
If the outputs of the predecessor, current and successor cells are labelled as S(P), S( c) 
and S( s), respectively then the current cell behaviour for a cell according to an elastic 
protocol is given below. 
Iff( (S(P) = Set x) and (S(s) = Set x) ) 
then 
next S(c) = f( S(P) ) 
else 
next S(c) = S(c) 
Similarly, for the inelastic protocol, behaviour is described in the following way. 
Iff( (S(P) = Set x) and (S(s) = Set x» 
then 
next S(c) = f( S(P» 
else 
next S(c) = S(c) 
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4.5.1.2 Faulty couditions 
The behaviour exhibited by the both the elastic and inelastic protocols under normal 
conditions was presented in sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 respectively. This section 
explores the influence of the protocol on IFIS designs when subjected to fault 
conditions using an example architecture. This is done to discover if the expectations 
described in section 4.2.1 are fulfilled. Figure 4-7 shows the architecture of the 
example used to explore the behaviour of the existing protocols under fault conditions. 
Figure 4-7 shows a shift register of the form described in Figure 4-6. The shift register 
has coded data input at A and coded data output at Z. Furthermore, the intermediate 
element outputs are observable and are labelled according to the parent element 
names. 
· -------------Aa ~ EI~ent FB , . I- -' Element _ Element ~ Element 
A EO El E2 Z 
EO El E2 
Figure 4-7 Architecture used to demonstrate fault conditions. 
In Figure 4-7 the dotted line shows the feedback from the element labelled El as 
being separate from the element output. This is also the case for the remaining 
elements in the shift register and more typically represents practical design 
implementations. This can be attributed to the difference in output buffering required 
as a result of fanout in complex designs. Furthermore, the clock line has been omitted 
from Figure 4-7 for clarity. The fault site is marked by a. and is positioned such that 
the effects are not observable at El but are observable by element E2. Such a fault 
may be caused by a defect in the physical interconnect such as a crack (intermittent 
behaviour) or may result from metal migration. The following discussions describe 
behaviour resulting from the injection of a I -+ 0 fault injection and simulations of 
behaviour under such fault conditions are presented where necessary. The generic 
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behaviour of the design is unaffected by the coding scheme. The saturated coding 
scheme described in section 4.3 is employed for the purpose of example. 
Elastic protocol: According to the expectations from IFIS described in section 4.2.1, 
self-transitions resulting from the processing of upstream elements signify an error. 
Furthermore, once an error has occurred the protocol must prevent future data 
propagation. The introduction of a temporary logic affecting fault has the effect of 
temporarily halting data flow within the shift register because the protocol condition is 
not fulfilled. However, once the fault is removed, it is possible for new data to be 
correctly represented at the original fault site. Following data loss processing resumes 
according to the behaviour described in Figure 4-4. The elastic protocol is therefore 
incapable of ensuring permanent prevention of data propagation following fault 
manifestation. 
Inelastic protocol: Figure 4-8 shows a simulation of the example design under fault 
conditions. 
FAULT 
RESET 
CLOCK 
E2 o o 
z 0* o 
FB U : 1 
Fig we 4-8 Effects of a specific fault on the behaviour base on the existing inelastic protocol. 
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The fault is activated between the rising clock edge labelled i and that labelled ii 
following nonnal design' initialisation using the RESET signal. The fault becomes 
apparent at the output to element E2 at the edge ii. This is because the input to E2 is 
not El (0*) due to the fault a. Element E2 observes a 0 from El and a 0* from 
element Z. This does not fulfil the existing inelastic protocol condition and so E2 does 
not process. The halting is shown to propagate to elements Z and El at edge iii and to 
element EO at edge iv. At the edge iv element El processes. This is because the stable, 
halted, state of E2 belongs to the same state set as the most recent state held on the 
output of element EO. The resultant transition at output El (I to 0) is illegal according 
to table 4-1. Hence, this protocol condition does not satisfy the requirements defined 
in section 4.2.1. 
The reason that this behaviour occurs is that the difference between the initial halting 
of the predecessor element and the successor element (say, EO and E2) is two clock 
cycles. Thus the outputs of these cells belong to the same data set and therefore fulfil 
the protocol condition for the current element. 
4.5.2 Proposed Protocol Condition 
In section 4.5.1 it was found that neither the elastic nor the inelastic protocol could be 
guaranteed to completely prevent error recovery. They both exhibit the potential to 
generate corrupt data. This is because recovery is inherent in the elastic protocol and 
because an insufficient number of node values were considered by the inelastic 
protocol. A modification to the inelastic protocol is presented and the behaviour is 
analysed. 
Examination of Figure 4-8 shows that the initial halt of all elements results in all 
element outputs holding data from a single set (Set 0 or Set I). This follows from 
halting being propagated at the rate of one element per clock cyc!e. Clearly, for fault-
free operation, the outputs of neighbouring elements always belong to different code 
sets. To check this requires the monitoring of direct neighbours. The existing protocol 
conditions do not perfonn this check. 
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To address the problem highlighted in section 4.5.1 a new protocol condition is 
proposed. The behaviour of the current cell according to the proposed protocol is 
described in the following way. 
Iff( (S(P) = Set x) and (S(c) = Set x) and (S(s) = Set x)) 
then 
next S(c) = f( S(P)) 
else 
next S(c) = S(c) 
Figure 4-9 Interconnection of processing elements ~: 'B: 'C: and 'D' according to the 
proposed protocol condition. 
Figure 4-9 shows the implication of the proposed protocol condition. The proposed 
protocol condition requires that processing elements monitor their own outputs thus 
increasing the number of inputs to each element. Figure 4-9 shows the additional self-
feedback as FBI while the existing successor output supplies FB2. 
4.5.2.1 Fault-free conditions 
The proposed protocol condition is now applied to the example introduced in section 
4.5.1. For clarity, the signals labelled FB I in Figure 4-9 can be considered as internal 
to each processing element, thus the architecture shown in Figure 4-7 still applies. 
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RESET 
CLOCK 
A u 
EO 0 1* 
El 0* 1 
E2 0 
Z 0* 1 
FB u 
Figure 4-10 Behaviour of the proposed protocol under fault:free conditions. 
Comparison of the inelastic protocol condition in section 4.5.1 and the proposed 
protocol condition in section 4.5.2 reveal that under fault-free conditions, both the 
behaviour and symbol rate are identical. Examination of Figure 4-10 shows this to be 
the case. Figure 4-10 shows that under fault-free conditions the data progresses 
through the pipeline at the rate of one element per clock cycle. 
4.5.2.2 Faulty conditions 
Despite identical behaviour between the inelastic protocol condition in section 4.5.1 
and the proposed protocol condition in section 4.5.2 under fault-free conditions, the 
behaviour of designs implemented according to the different protocol conditions can 
differ under fault conditions. 
In Figure 4-11, the fault is enabled between the rising clock edges labelled i and ii. 
The cell with output E2 cannot process on the clock edge ii because the fault modifies 
El causing its parity to be incorrect. Furthermore, unlike the scenario shown in Figure 
4-8, element El cannot process on the clock edge labelled iv. While the outputs from 
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element EO and E2 confonn to the protocol condition, the monitored output of El 
itself is not from the correct data set. The protocol condition is therefore not fulfilled. 
FAULT 
RESET 
CLOCK 
A u 0* : 1* : 0 1* : 
EO 0 0* .. : 1 : 1*: 0 
El 0* 
E2 0 0 
Z 0* 0 
FB u 0 1 * : 
III Iv v 
Figure 4-11 Behaviour of the proposed protocol under a single injected fault condition. 
FAULT 
RESET 
CLOCK 
A u 1* : 0 0* : 1 * , 0 1 * : o 
!" .... 
EO 0 O~.: 1* : 0 
r···· 
El o· 0 0" 
E2 0 0*, 0 
Z 0* 0 : 0* : 0 
FB 1* : 0*: 0 0* : 0* : 1 * : 1* 
11 HI Iv 
Figure 4-12 Behaviour of the proposed protocol under a single injected fault-condition and 
where the code translation blocks ignore the effects of error detection. 
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Figure 4-12 shows that the pipeline remains frozen even when data is continually 
applied to the upstream/downstream pipeline inputs. This situation can occur if the 
. circuit external to the pipeline ignores the halting information passed to it by the 
pipeline itself. This may result from additional faults or from design techniques not 
conforming to the specification. 
4.5.3 Summary of Behaviour of Alternative Versions of IFIS 
The behaviour of a potential on-line test system based on a commonly used 
asynchronous (elastic) protocol under faulty conditions was described in addition to 
the generic protocol under normal conditions. Furthermore, an inelastic protocol based 
on monitoring the same number of nodes in the same logical position was examined. 
Neither of these protocols satisfied the behavioural requirements specified in section 
4.2.1. A modification to the inelastic protocol was proposed and the behavioural 
attributes examined under fault-free and fault conditions. While the example only 
highlighted a specific fault type, a more in depth examination of behaviour under 
different fault conditions applied to a design implemented using the proposed protocol 
condition is performed in chapter 7. 
Table 4-3 summarises the behavioural properties associated with the different 
protocol/coding techniques. 
ProtocoVcode Maximum Maximum Halting type 
combination symbol rate data rate (worst case) 
Elastic-R TZ Y, clocks Y. clocks Temporary 
Elastic-Saturated Y, clocks Y, clocks Temporary 
lnelastic-RTZ lIc10ck Y, clocks Temporary 
Inelastic-Saturated lIc10ck lIclock Temporary 
Proposed-RTZ lIc10ck Y, clocks Permanent 
Proposed-Saturated lIc10ck lIclock Permanent 
Table 4-3 Behaviour a/the protocollcoding combinations. 
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Table 4-3 shows that when considering data rate and halting behaviour, the proposed 
inelastic protocol using the saturated coding exhibits the most attractive properties 
within the context of on-line testing. 
4.6 TEST COVERAGE ASSOCIATED WITH ALTERNATIVE VERSIONS OF IFIS 
The maximum test coverage that can be achieved for a specific design is restricted by 
its structure and the test vectors which can be applied to it. By definition, a protocol 
restricts the vector set which can be processed by processing elements and therefore 
potentially restricts the maximum test coverage achievable for a specific design. 
The proportion of codes which allow processing is dependent on the coding scheme 
used and the protocol in addition to the width of data to be carried by the code. Table 
4-4 contains data relating to existing RTZ code/protocol combinations designed to 
transfer data of width one. 
Data Feedback RTZLegal RTZElastic RTZ Inelastic 
code code State Process Process 
00 00 ~ v 00 01 ..J 
00 10 ..J ..J 
00 11 
01 00 ~ v 01 01 ..J 
01 10 ..J ..J 
01 11 
10 00 ~ v 10 01 ..J 
10 10 ..J ..J 
10 11 
11 00 
11 01 
11 10 
11 11 
Total 9 4 5 
Table 4-4 Characteristics of existing protocol conditions on a single data bit RTZ code. 
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All possible binary combinations obtained by concatenating the data code and 
feedback code are represented in table 4-4. Those combined words that do not contain 
the illegal RTZ code described in section 4.3.1 are marked in the RTZ legal state 
column. The markers in the RTZ Inelastic Process and RTZ Elastic Process column 
correspond to combinations that fulfil the appropriate protocol conditions. 
ProtocoVcode Number of Number of possible Number of codes which 
combination state codes binary codes cause processing 
Elastic-RTZ 3(d+1) 2'(d+1) . 2"+ 2 
Elastic-Saturated 2 2(d+1) 2 2(d+1) 2(d+2) 
Inelastic-RTZ 3(d+1) 2 2(d+1) 2("+1)+1 
Inelastic-Saturated 2 4d+1) 2 2(d+1) 2(d+,) 
Proposed-RTZ 3(d+') 2'(d+') 2(d+1)+1 
Proposed-Saturated 2,(d+2) 2,(d+2) 2(d+') 
Table 4-5 Characteristics of code/protocol combinations carrying d data bits. 
Table 4-5 describes the characteristics of the code/protocol combinations presented in 
this chapter. In the table d represents the width of the data applied. Table 4-4 applies to 
RTZ codes where d is 1. The infonnation contained in Table 4-5 is graphically 
represented in Figure 4-13 and Figure 4-14. 
PROPORTION OF POSSIBLE STATES WHICH ARE ALLOWABLE AND 
THEREFORE CAUSE PROCESSING (IMPLEMENTATION INDEPENDENT) 
~r-------------------------------------------~ 
• 
.. 
• 
-+- ELASTIC RTZ 
-INELASTIC RTZ 
-Existing Saturated 
- Proposed RTl 
- Proposed Saturated 
• • • No. oflndlpend,nllFIS DATA Inputl 
.. 
Figure 4-13 Proportion of states that allow processing in different codelprotocol 
combinations and with different input data widths. 
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PROPORTION OF POSSIBLE STATES WHICH ARE ALLOWABLE 
AND THEREFORE CAUSE CELL PROCESSING (CONVENTIONAL 
DIGITAL IMPLEMENTATION) 
",------------------------, 
" 
.. 
-+- ELASTIC RIZ 
-INELASTIC RTZ 
-Existing Saturated 
-Proposed RTZ 
- Proposed Saturated 
" 
3 I 5 11 7 
No. of Independent IFIS DATA Inputs " 
Figure 4-14 Proportion of binary state codes that allow processing in different code/protocol 
combinations and with different input data widths. 
Figure 4-13 shows the proportion of states for each coding/protocol combination that 
fulfil the appropriate protocol condition. Figure 4-13 shows that the inelastic protocol 
with RTZ coding appears to be the least restrictive of those examined. The 
information presented in Figure 4-13 is independent of implementation, and therefore 
ignores the illegal state that is inherent of providing three separate states using a dual-
rail coding scheme. 
Figure 4-14 shows the proportion of protocol condition fulfilling codes for each 
coding/protocol combination. The information contained in Figure 4-14 is specific to 
binary implementations and is therefore more relevant to the remainder of the work 
presented in this thesis. In Figure 4-14, the existing saturated codes are the least 
restrictive of the schemes examined. Furthermore, as the data width increases, the 
difference in potential restriction between all of the considered coding/protocol 
combinations becomes indistinguishable. 
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4.7 CONCLUSIONS 
Evidence has been presented showing that data throughput; behaviour under fault 
conditions and the potential to restrict on-line test coverage can all be influenced by 
~. the choice of coding scheme, type of protocol and choice of monitored nodes. 
Three sets of processing rules (protocols) were identified. Elastic and inelastic 
protocols that required the monitoring of predecessor and successor outputs were both 
found to be incapable of ensuring permanent halting after error detection. This is 
inherent for elastic protocols because the states of monitored nodes do not change 
concurrently, thus an unstable relationship between them exists. In the case of the 
inelastic protocol this behaviour could be attributed to insufficient monitoring. This 
was confinued by comparison with the third protocol: an inelastic protocol that 
incorporates an additional condition (monitored node). 
Data throughput is affected by the choice of protocol type (elastic/inelastic) and the 
coding scheme. In the case of inelastic protocols all symbols move in unison. 
Consequently, the symbol rate is the same as that for conventional binary systems. 
The elastic protocol only allows symbols to progress following acknowledgement of 
their previous use. This requires a minimum of two processing cycles to achieve and 
therefore elastic protocols are limited to a maximum of half the processing rate of that 
exhibited by conventional binary systems. Coding can limit the data throughput when 
the symbol rate does not represent the data rate. The RTZ coding scheme separates 
data with tokens and therefore falls into this category. 
The potential to restrict on-line test coverage is caused by restricting the ratio of 
codewords to non-codewords, thus restricting the range of vectors that can be used for 
on-line fault stimulation. Evidence resulting from comparisons of the three protocols 
shows that the additional protocol condition further restricts the ability to process, 
thus restricting the ratio of codewords to non-codewords. Comparison of the coding 
schemes shows that the RTZ coding scheme has a greater potential to restrict on-line 
test coverage because of its lower ratio of codewords to non-codewords. Furthenuore, 
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due to the imbalance in the RTZ coding scheme, the choice of protocol can further 
influence this ratio. 
Where increased test coverage depends on the application of specific vectors to the 
processing element under scrutiny, the more restrictive coding/protocol combinations 
are least likely to pennit the specific vector application. While the potential 
constraints of the protocol/coding combinations indicate that test vectors can only be 
chosen from a subset of all possible input vectors, this does not necessarily constrain 
the test coverage exhibited by the chosen vectors. The test coverage exhibited by 
applicable vectors depends on the suitability of the vectors to the circuit under test and 
the structure of the circuit. 
Based on the previous discussion in the context of the expectations presented in 
section 4.2.1, the proposed protocol condition in conjunction with saturated dual-rail 
coding offer the most attractive properties. This combination is therefore selected as a 
basis for the design ofIFIS systems. 
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5.1 OBJECTIVES OF CHAPTER 
The choice of IFIS protocol directly influences the interconnectivity of processing 
elements (cells) within IFIS systems. The protocol was selected in chapter four. This 
investigation is targeted at the internal circuit structure of the IFIS cells that support 
the chosen protocol and dual-rail code. The objectives of this investigation are to: 
• Understand the influence of applying different design techniques to the 
generation of reference information and verification/error management 
circuitry within IFIS processing elements. 
• Select that structure which provides the best features in the context of on-line 
testable systems. The selected structure will then be adopted as a template for 
future designs. 
5.2 INTRODUCTION 
The structure of designs is known to affect the properties associated with them. 
Within the context of design-for-test, circuit structure is tailored to provide the most 
acceptable combination of test coverage and hardware penalty for the specific 
application. This investigation examines the influence of the circuit structure applied 
to IFIS processing elements on the following: 
• Testability 
• Data throughput 
• Complexity 
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These attributes were chosen because they are those which are commonly used to 
distinguish between design for test techniques. Cell partitioning is considered and a 
nwnber of alternative structures that were described in the review are applied to 
processing element sub-blocks. The options, together with altemative proposals are 
quantitatively· compared and a generic IFIS processing element architecture is 
developed. 
5.3 CELL PARTITIONING 
Each IFIS processing element (cell) must be capable of providing reference data, 
. performing validation and contributing to error management. Error management 
results from validation of incoming data to each IFIS cell. According to the protocol 
selected in chapter four, IFIS cell outputs are updated or they retain their previous 
value depending on the validity of incoming data. This output data is transmitted to 
other cells which in turn validate it. From the above discussion the processes of 
computation and transmission are separate tasks which can be performed in parallel. 
Figure 5-1 shows the generic cell structure implied by the above description. 
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Figure 5-IAnatomy of an IFIS cell. 
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DATA 
In Figure 5-1 the cell boundary is marked by a dotted line. All signals, with the 
exception of the clock and reset signals are represented using dual-rail codes of the 
form chosen in chapter four. The clock and reset signal are carried by single wires in 
the conventional sense. 
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Figure 5-1 shows that the IFIS cell comprises three sub-blocks that perfonn the 
functions of protocol verification and transmission control, computation and storage. 
The functions of protocol verification and transmission control are perfonned within a 
single sub-block that controls which data codes are to be transmitted according to the 
validity of the codes appearing at the cell inputs. The computation sub-block operates 
on data codes appearing at the IFIS cell inputs and generates IFIS coded outputs. The 
computation block generates codes that represent a combinational function of the data 
content of the codes appearing at the cell inputs. The storage sub-block is updated on 
the rising edge of each clock cycle with data supplied at its inputs.· The sub-blocks of 
interest within the scope of this investigation are the computation block and the block 
responsible for transmission control. The remainder of this investigation is structured 
to reflect this partitioning. 
5.4 COMPUTATION 
In Chapter two a number of techniques were described which pennit reference data to 
be calculated for the purpose of validation. These techniques were classified as being 
infonnation redundant, hardware redundant or time redundant. The techniques 
described were not specifically intended for use within a system that is controlled by a 
strict protocol like IFIS, and consequently modifications to the techniques need to be 
made to pennit their use. 
The generic modifications required to calculate IFIS codes are described and a 
representative design technique from each redundancy category is presented. The 
effects of design scaling in association with these techniques is assessed with respect 
to the attributes of testability, data throughput and complexity. 
5.4.1 Adapting Conventional Techniques to IFIS 
It is the task of the computation block to accept dual-rail codes and generate dual-rail 
codes. The dual-rail codes appearing at the computational block/cell inputs represent 
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binary data words where each component bit is represented as an individual dual-rail 
code. The dual-rail codes conform to the saturated four-phase coding scheme 
described in chapter four. 
Examination of the saturated coding scheme (shown in table 4-1) reveals that the t bit 
from the dual-rail pair (t,f) always contains the binary representation of the coded 
data. This implies that the data content of the generated output codes can be calculated 
by examination of the incoming t bits alone. 
The computation block output codes must belong to the same code set as the current 
inputs. This is because the outputs of the computation block become the outputs of the 
current cell on the next rising clock edge if the protocol is obeyed. If the symbol 
movement within IFIS designs is to conform to the selected protocol, codes appearing 
at the current cell outputs must belong to a different code set from the codes appearing 
at the outputs of the predecessor/successor cells. 
In chapter four the code sets were shown to be distinguishable by examination of the 
parity of member codes. This suggests that output codes can be generated by knowing 
which is the parent set of the input codes, and knowing the data content of the codes 
to be generated. While it is important that the output codes are valid according to the 
protocol, a number of techniques can be employed to generate them. 
5.4.2 IFIS Code Generation: The Need for Redundancy 
The discussion presented in section 5.4.1 suggests that the structure associated with 
accepting and generating t bits (henceforth known as the t-structure) is independent of 
the structure associated with accepting and generating f bits (henceforth known as the 
f-structure). Indeed, the t-structure is conventional in nature. 
Figure 5-2 shows the behavioural architecture that generates correct output codes to 
satisfy the IFIS protocol under fault-free conditions but does not take fault effects into 
account. The f-structure monitors the parity of a selected dual-rail input data bit (all 
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should be from the same set) and ensures that the parity of all dual-rail outputs is the 
same. 
F bits F bits. 
l~ • 
T bits FUNCTION T bits' 
Figure 5-2 Code generation without computation protection. 
The architecture shown in Figure 5-2, while generating IFIS codes, does not generate 
the reference information independently from the data that it is supposed to protect. 
Indeed, the reference information is calculated from it thus ensuring the occurrence of 
fault masking under fault-conditions. 
5.4.3 Relevant Design Properties 
Unlike the context in which testability is normally applied, the on-line test 
environment provides error detection based on the comparison between data observed 
and reference data that was concurrently calculated. In the case ofIFIS, the actual data 
and the reference data are combined to form IFIS codes at the output of the IFIS cell. 
The IFIS codes themselves are checked for correctness by other IFIS cells. The ability 
of codes to detect errors was defmed in [Russe1l89] and is called the error detection 
abilty (EDA). The EDA is applied to on-line error detecting techniques and as such 
assumes independence between generation of reference information and the data that 
it corroborates. 
It is well known that for dual rail codes all single bit errors can be detected because 
the Hamming distance between codewords is 2. Therefore any error that is confined 
either to data or is confined to reference generation is detectable. 
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A scalable complexity approximation can be obtained for the architecture shown in 
Figure 5-2 in terms of nand gate equivalents. To enable comparison with other 
techniques while also providing an insight into design scaling, a function with known 
scalability characteristics was selected. 
The function is an an nxn cellular array multiplier. The particular architecture is 
described in [AImainiS9] and comprises nl partial product and gates and nl_n full 
adders. For such a multiplier with 2n outputs, 2n+1 exclusive-or gates are required to 
realise the structure shown in Figure 5-2. As a basis for future comparison the 
complexity characteristics associated with this design are presented in Table 5-1. 
Structure Nand Gate Equivalent 
And Gate I 
XorGate 3 
Full Adder S 
Multiplier (S+I)n2_ Sn 
Top 9n2-2n+3 
Table 5-1 Complexity of an unprotected architecture for generating IFIS codes. 
Table 5-1 shows the nand gate equivalent of each component where n represents the 
number of bits in the multiplicand (multiplier). The nand gate equivalents shown are 
approximations based on the number of MOS transistors in the CMOS 
implementations of standard cells, where a nand gate comprises four transistors. The 
entry labelled Top describes the number of nand gate equivalents in the complete 
structure shown in Figure 5-2. 
5.4.4 Information Redundancy 
The architecture shown in Figure 5-3 constructs valid IFIS codes if the coded function 
generates valid residue codes. If this is not the case, the exclusive-or gate supplied by 
the comparator attempts to force the parity of all IFIS cell dual-rail outputs to be 
incorrect. This implementation contains only combinational circuitry. The speed of 
the components need therefore only be sufficient to ensure that function outputs are 
stable within the duration of one system clock cycle. 
71 
CHAPTER FIVE IFIS CELL DESIGN 
The IFIS protocol can detect any logical fault that affects only one rail of each dual-
rail output pair. This property is characteristic of dual-rail codes. Assuming a single 
fault multiplicity, the fault can either occur within the f-structure or within the t-
structure. 
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Figure 5-3 Code generation with computation protection provided by information 
redundancy 
Under fault-free conditions the signal line 'A' should alternate on successive clock 
cycles because it carries the parity of dual-rail codes on the cell inputs. Any fault that 
affects 'A' either makes it assume an incorrect value or is insignificant. If 'A' is 
incorrect the signal 'C' becomes incorrect and therefore the cell outputs belong to the 
" incorrect code set, as defined in Table 4-1. Any fault that is detectable by the residue 
coding scheme causes the signal line 'B' to rise. This causes 'C' to be inverted 
causing the cell outputs to be incorrect. If a fault occurs on 'B' such that it remains at 
zero, this is not detectable. For this reason, the ability of the function block to generate 
codes that accurately represent its internal integrity is less than the ability of the 
residue code to detect errors within the t-structure. The architecture exhibits the 
following additional limitations: 
• Increasing the number of bits in the residue (to increase probability of 
error detection) decreases the suitability of the architecture. This is 
because the number of bits in the IFIS data inputs must be exactly 
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divisible by the number of bits in the associated residue prior to 
multiplication if a low cost residue code is to be used. 
• Although it is possible to generate residue codes for Boo lean algebra 
functions, the area overhead can be significant in comparison to the area 
overhead incurred for arithmetic functions [Russe1189]. 
Table 5-2 shows the scalable nand gate equivalent of each component in the 
architecture with the exception of those defined in Table 5-1. 
Structure Nand Gate Equivalent 
Arithmetic Multiplier 9n2 - 8n 
Residue Multiplier 20 
Modular Adder (MA) 3Xor+ 8 
Residue Generator (RGi) «n-l )/2)MA 
Residue Generator (RGo) (n-l)MA 
Comparator 4Xor+2 
Top 9n2+38n 
Table 5-2 Complexity of an architecture protected by information redundancy. 
The Table applies to a two check-bit residue code (base 22-1=3). The modulo adders, 
residue generators and comparator are therefore identical to those described in 
[Russe1189] . 
. 5.4.5 Hardware Redundancy 
The architecture shown in Figure 5-4 uses hardware redundancy to generate reference 
information and data independently. As was the case in section 5.4.4, this structure is 
purely combinational and therefore the speed of the components need only be 
sufficient to ensure that function outputs are stable within the duration of one system 
clock cycle. The f-structure in Figure 5-4 is constructed such that it forms a self-dual 
function as described in [Shedletsky78]. The employed exclusive-or structure ensures 
that the values held at 'A' and 'B' are always identical under fault-free conditions. 
The same properties apply to the values at 'C' and 'D'. 
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Figure 5-4 Code generation with computation protection provided by hardware.redundancy. 
Under fault-free conditions, the signal labelled 'P' alternates with each successive 
clock cycle. Any fault that causes 'P' not to be correct ensures a code from the 
incorrect code set to appear at the function outputs. The independence of the f-
structure and the t-structure ensure that incorrect codes are formed at the function 
output under all excited fault conditions that affect only the outputs of the t-structure 
or the outputs of the f-structure. This architecture has the following advantages: 
• The architecture is generic and can be. directly applied to any Boolean 
function. Furthermore, being generic facilitates the design process. 
• Test patterns generated for testing one internal function can be used to test 
the other identical function in parallel during production test. This 
minimises pattern generation time and minimises production test time. 
• All checking is performed by the IFIS code checker, thus maintaining the 
conceptual design partitioning. 
Structure Nand Gate Equivalent 
Multiplier 9n2 _ 8n 
Xor 3 
Top 18n2 -4n+3 
Table 5-3 Complexity of an architecture protected by hardware redundancy. 
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Table 5-3 shows the scalable nand gate equivalent of each component in the 
architecture shown in Figure 5-4. 
5.4.6 Time Redundancy 
The architecture shown in Figure 5-5 uses time redundancy to generate reference 
information and data independently. 
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Figure 5-5 Code generation with computation protection provided by time redundancy 
Unlike the architectures based on information redundancy and hardware redundancy, 
the components must be fast enough to perform calculations twice within the duration 
of a normal system clock cycle. 
A similar exclusive-or structure is incorporated in the f-structure to that in Figure 5-4 
such that under fault-free conditions 'A' and 'B' carry the same values. A similar 
observation holds for 'C' and '0'. 
The operation of the architecture shown in Figure 5-5 is based loosely on that 
described in [PateI83], During the first calculation step the value held at 'B' is 
operated upon and the answer is stored in the synchronous register. Then the output of 
the synchronous Hype flip-flop toggles thus disabling the register and selecting the 
value held at 'A'. 'A' is processed through the multiplier using a different path to that 
used for processing 'B'. The shifted output of the multiplier appears at 'C' in time for 
the function outputs to be stable by the next rising system clock edge. 
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A description of fault-conditions affecting 'P'. was described in section 5.4.5. In 
[pateI83] it was shown that for multiplication, a single bit shift in both the 
multiplicand and the multiplier is sufficient to ensure that fault masking does not 
occur. Consequently single faults are always detectable for the described multiplier. 
The following disadvantages are associated with this architecture: 
• A local clock generator is required to produce a local clock for the 
function. This can cause testability problems by increasing the number of 
sequential elements, thus adding nodes with low levels of controllability 
and observability. 
• Due to the requirement for storage, test pattern generation for such a block 
requires a sequential test pattern generator unless the synchronous register 
itself provides additional test access for use during production testing. 
• The scaling of the arithmetic function outputs is dependent on the 
function. If the function is an adder, then only one dividing shift is 
required (11+11 = «110 + 110) shifted once). However, 11 multiplied by 
11 = «110 x 110) shifted twice». 
• The same principle of operation carmot be applied to Boolean functions. 
Structure Nand Gate Equivalent 
Multiplier (n+1) x (n+1) 9n2 + IOn + 1 
Multiplexer 3 
T-type Flip-flop 7 
Register (width 2n) 14n 
Top 9n2+42n+ 18 
Table 5-4 Complexity of an architecture protected by time redundancy. 
Table 5-4 shows the scalable nand gate equivalent of each component in the 
architecture shown in Figure 5-4. 
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5.4.7 Summary of Computation Techniques 
A number of alternative computation block architectures have been presented and 
their characteristics have been discussed. Table 5-5 summarizes the most important 
characteristics of the alternative techniques in the context of IFIS computation block 
design. 
. 
Protection Suitability Suitability Protocol Effect on 
Method to to Non- Based SSA Circuit 
Arithmetic arithmetic Coverage Speed 
None 
" " 
Very Iow -equal to 
(behavioural) dual 
Residue 
" 
"oO Statistically <dual 
coding high 
Duality 
" " 
100% -1.0 
Pipeline 
" 
X 100% max. =0.5 
Table 5-5 Suitability of different architectural design approaches to the IFlSfunction. 
All of the described techniques can be used for designing arithmetic computation 
blocks. However, residue coding is known to be inefficient for protecting logical 
(non-arithmetic) functions [RusseII89]. This is characteristic of arithmetic codes. 
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Figure 5-6 Complexity comparison of the techniques applied to computation block design. 
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While it was shown that non-arithmetic operations could be protected by the pipeline 
architecture used in [PateI83], the architectures were all regular in nature. This 
technique is not suitable for non-datapath Boolean functions. 
The protocol based single stuck-at (SSA) fault coverage refers to the proportion of 
faults that cause protocol disruption. A qualitative approach has been applied because 
the values depend on the ratio of collapsed faults within a function block to the 
complete number of collapsed faults existing within the computation block (IFIS cell). 
The effect of different techniques on circuit speed is described with respect to a 
conventional equivalent implementation. 
Figure 5-6 provides a graphical representation of the complexity data accompanying 
the descriptions of each design alternative. Clearly, the architecture based on hardware 
redundancy results in the most complex designs. 
5.5 TRANSMISSION 
The selection of codes for transmission to other IFIS cells is based on the adherence of 
cell inputs to the IFIS protocol. As such, the task of transmission control can be 
partitioned into the sub-tasks of data validation and data selection. This partitioning 
leads to independent circuits that perform the separate tasks. The partitioned design 
option implies a clear boundary between the sub-functions thus allowing the 
application of a number of standard design approaches to the task of data validation. 
An alternative approach is to design a single unit that performs both tasks, without 
constraining the structure to contain a logical interface between them. This approach 
may lead to a more efficient design. 
A number of alternative techniques for realising the different partitioning options are 
presented. The effects of design are assessed with respect to the attributes of 
testability, and complexity. 
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5.5.1 Partitioned Design 
A number of design techniques are presented for the separate tasks of code validation 
and code selection. The techniques are compared with respect to complexity and 
single stuck-at fault coverage. 
5.5.1.1 Detection alternatives 
The task of the presented architectures is to check the validity of the IFIS codes 
appearing at the IFIS cell inputs and generate an output accordingly. Figure 5-7 shows 
the architectures that were chosen for comparison. 
The decoder architecture shown in Figure 5-7(A) is that which is directly derived from 
the behavioural description of the validation circuitry and synthesised using the 
Intergraph tools. When the parity of the codes placed on the dual-rail data inputs and 
successor cell feedback are all even and the parity of the current cell output is odd or 
visa-versa, then the design output assumes a logic' I '. 
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Figure 5-7 Protocol validation architectures. A) Decoder B) Exclusive-or tree C) Group 
Parity Prediction based protection D) Self-checking checker hybrid. 
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The exclusive-or-tree architecture shown in Figure 5-7(B) forms a comparator. 
Exclusive-or trees are known to be difficult to test under production test conditions 
because of the inability to control internal circuit nodes independently. However, the 
on-line test coverage afforded by IFIS codes applied to these structures is unknown. 
When the parity of the codes placed on the dual-rail data inputs and successor cell 
feedback are all the same and the parity of the current cell output is different then the 
design output assumes a logic' I ' . 
The ability of an on-line test system to test the checking circuitry in addition to the 
circuitry that it protects is evidently attractive. The IFIS validation circuitry is no 
exception. The architectures presented in Figure 5-7(C) and Figure 5-7(0) are targeted 
at fulfilling this goal. 
The group parity prediction architecture shown in Figure 5-7(C) was presented in 
[Fujiwara84] and can be applied to any combinational design. It is not specifically 
targeted at IFIS and consequently is not shown with IFIS specific modifications. This 
technique checks the outputs of the combinational circuit 'Cl' against reference data 
provided by 'C/. The relationship between Cl and C2 is such that when combined by 
the function 'F', members of a specific code set occur at 'Z', where Z={ZO,ZI, .. Zn}. 
This is definable at the time of design and determines the valid codeword inputs to the 
output decoder shown in Figure 5-7C. Zo, ZI and Zn are shown in Figure 5-7C. To 
access parity information within an IFIS code checker, the checker inputs can be 
checked directly. The only circuitry thus checked becomes an array of exclusive-or 
gates. To check this array (Cl) requires that C2 is an array of exciusive-(n)or gates, 
which increases the circuit complexity by -100%. However, the nature of IFIS code 
sequences ensures that if computation blocks are fully testable, then the parity 
checking gates within any IFIS checker can be fully exercised. If an incorrect output is 
generated by the IFIS checking circuitry then the characteristic halting takes over. The 
above discussion preciudes further examination of this architecture. 
The self-checking-checker hybrid shown in Figure 5-7(0) is based on a self-checking 
dual-rail checker described in [Siewiorek92]. The SCC expects and only generates 
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odd parity codes under fault-free conditions. The outputs ZIP and Z2 are additional 
IFIS cell outputs and thus must form correct IFIS codes under fault-free conditions. 
This increases the observability of the output of validation checking circuitry. The ZI 
and Z2 outputs are used to control code selection. When the parity of the self-
feedback input is even (odd), the parity of the remaining dual-rail inputs should be 
odd (even) and the ZIP and Z2 outputs should form an odd (even) parity code. 
a). Complexity 
Once a specific checker architecture has been chosen, it must be possible to tailor it to 
the specific application. 
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Figure 5-8 Generic decoder architecture. 
In the case of the code checking circuitry for IFIS cells the number of coded data 
inputs to the IFlS cell dictates the complexity of the checker used to validate them. 
Figure 5-8 shows a generic implementation of the decoder that was introduced in 
Figure 5-7. This circuit is used as an example to describe how input scaling effects the 
complexity of the various architectural alternatives. 
Figure 5-8 shows that irrespective of the number of dual-rail data inputs, the number 
offeedback inputs remains constant at 2. The generic architecture thus contains 'n+2' 
excIusive-or/exclusive-nor gates and one two-input nand gate. The complexity of the 
remaining two gates varies according to 'n' such that together they contain 4(n+2) + 2 
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transistors. This is equivalent to 'n+2' two-input nand gates and an inverter. Based on 
the nand gate equivalent for an exclusive-or/exclusive-nor gate used in Table 5-1, the 
total generic complexity associated with this architecture is (3+ 1)(n+2) + 1.5 nand 
gate equivalents. Table 5-6 describes the effects of scaling 'n', the number of dual-rail 
data inputs, on the complexity of the examined architectures. 
Architecture Nand Gate Equivalent 
Decoder 4n +9.5 
Exclusive-or tree (13n + 26) 12 
SCChybrid 9(n+ 1) 
Table 5-6 Complexity of alternative checkers. 
b). Test coverage 
The maximum test coverage that can be exhibited by a design depends on the design 
structure and the range of vectors to which it can be subjected. Conventional 
synchronous designs are frequently subjected to structural tests during production 
testing. To simplify test application and response retrieval test structures are 
introduced that allow access to combinational circuit inputs and outputs. This is the 
scenario assumed when referring to production testing in this thesis. 
In Chaper four, a potential restriction in the range of values appearing at the inputs of 
IFIS cells was identified. This restriction was due to the IFIS protocol. As such, the 
effects of this restriction can be quantified in terms of the maximum test coverage 
affordable by a set of protocol obeying (those occuring under fault-free conditions) 
vectors when applied to specific design structures. Furthermore, advantage can be 
taken of the halting properties of the IFrS methodology. By introducing an incorrect 
IFIS code, the halting mechanism can be exercised. This results in a cell freeze under 
true fault-free conditions; the only recovery being a system reset. Figure 5-9 shows a 
specific implementation of the decoder architecture which is used as an example to 
describe the effects of changing On' on the maximum single-stuck-at fault coverage 
achievable under the conditions described above. The inputs SFB_T, SFB], FB_T, 
FB_F, A_T and A_F combine to form the dual-rail self-feedback, successor feedback 
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and data inputs respectively. 
In Figure 5-9 the positions and multiplicity of certain stuck-at faults have been 
labelled. For example, this design possesses six input lines with twelve possible single 
stuck-at faults associated with them. Generally, this equates to 4(n+2) SSA faults. To 
represent the physical implementation of a design more than two SSA faults can be 
associated with a single logical node. This is the case for the outputs of gates 'U', 'V' 
and 'W'. The outputs of these gates can be directly associated with 2(n+2) possible 
SSA faults. Due to the fanout of these nodes, additional SSA faults are associated with 
the inputs of gates 'X' and 'Y'. Fault collapsing results in the total number of faults 
described in Figure 5-9. 
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Figure 5-9 Test properties of the decoder architecture where n is equal to 1. 
Protocol obeying vectors cannot simultaneously sensitise the paths from the output of 
cell 'X' to cell 'Z' and from cell 'Y' to cell 'Z'. Consequently the faults labelled at the 
inputs to cell 'X' and cell 'Y' are not testable by the protocol. Similarly, under fault-
free conditions, the output of cell 'Z' never assumes a logic '0' and the stuck-at-l 
fault associated with it is never tested. The total number of SSA faults not testable by 
protocol obeying vectors is thus 2(n+ 2) + l. 
An incorrect code combination applied to the decoder inputs causes the outputs from 
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cell 'X' and cell 'Y' to be sensitised and an additional SSA fault on one of their 
respective inputs is tested. In this case a freeze was suggested as resulting in the 
vector (1,1,0) occurring on the cell outputs (U,V,W). The SSA fault tested by this 
specific occurrence is marked with an asterisk in the figure. When no fault exists 
within the decoder, the inputs to cell 'z' assume a logic' l' and the decoder output 
assumes a logic '0', thus testing it for a stuck-at-l condition. An induced freeze thus 
tests for an additional 2 faults. 
Further examination of Figure 5-9 shows that the faults undiscovered by the protocol 
followed by a freeze are located at the inputs to two gates namely, gate 'X' and gate 
'Y'. Only one of these faults is tested by the freeze condition. Anapproach that could 
reduce the need to check these faults could be to implement the complete checking 
structure as a standard cell and design the connections to these nodes defensively. 
While still being testable during production testing, the requirement to continually 
check them in the on-line test environment would be reduced. This technique would 
not be suitable for application to all nodes because it invariably increases the physical 
area of the standard cell and could become prohibitive. The effects of applying this 
method are described within Table 5-7 in the row labelled *Decoder. 
Architecture Collapsed Production Protocol Protocol + 
SSAFaults Test Freeze 
Decoder 8(n+2)+4 8(n+2)+4 6(n+2)+3 6(n+2)+5 
* Decoder 8(n+2)+4 8(n+2)+4 6(n+2)+3 6(n+2)+4 
(std cell) [6(n+2)+4] 
Exclusive-or II(n+2)+2 10(n+2)+2 10(n+2)+1 10(n+2)+2 
tree 
SCChybrid 30n+22 30n+22 30n+22 30n+22 
Table 5-7 Maximum SSA test coverage for alternative checkers. 
Table 5-7 describes the total number of collapsed stuck-at faults and the maximum 
coverage under different test conditions in terms of n: the number of dual-rail data 
inputs to the IFIS cel\. These descriptions were obtained by applying the techniques 
described in the above example to the examined architectures. 
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5.5.1.2 Data-flow Control 
The task of the presented architectures is to supply the storage block within the IFIS 
cell with its own, current output, or with the output of the computation block. Figure 
5-10 shows the considered architectures. 
The simple multiplexer array, shown in Figure S-IO(A), accepts a single control signal 
(valid signal) which when high causes the selector to route the output of the 
computation block to the IFIS cell output. The valid signal is that which is generated 
by selected architectures described in section 5.5.1.1. 
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Figure 5-10 Selector architectures for selecting one of two busses. each containing p dual-
. rail codes. A) Simple multiplexer array. B) Selector controlled by a dual-rail code. 
The selector controlled by a dual-rail code, shown in Figure S-IO(B), causes data to be 
routed from the computation block output to the IFIS cell output when a dual-rail code 
of odd parity appears on the control lines 'Zl' and 'Z2'. This architecture is suitable 
for use with the SCC hybrid shown in Figure 5-7. The Zl and Z2 outputs from the 
SCC hybrid are connected directly to the Zl and Z2 inputs of the selector respectively. 
The data contained in Table 5-8 summarises the effects upon complexity, total number 
of collapsed stuck-at faults and maximum number of detectable faults for each of the 
examined selector architectures. This information was obtained in the same way as 
previously described. 
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Architecture Complexity Collapsed Production Protocol P rotocol 
SSA Faults Test + Freeze 
Conventional 6p 16p [+2] 16p [+2] lOp [+ I] I 4p [+2] 
multiplexer 
Multiplexer ISp 4Sp [+4] 4Sp [+4] 36p [+4] 4 2p [+4] 
for SCC guard 
Table 5-8 Characteristics of the selector units. 
In Table 5-S 'p' represents the dual-rail data width of the computation block output. 
The selector architectures connect to the outputs of validation circuitry. As such, the 
number of combined collapsed stuck-at faults is not accUrately represented by 
summing those in each circuit because the connected nodes would be duplicated. The 
numbers within square brackets refer to the additional faults that must be considered if 
. each architecture is to be considered as stand-alone. 
5.5.2 Non-partitioned Design 
These design alternatives combine the functionality of code validation and selection 
into a single design block. This design approach does not impose a conceptual 
interface between the functions and therefore does not inflict artificial constraints on 
the circuit. The need to impose a freeze on the IFIS system to test the single 
communication path between the otherwise separate functions may therefore be 
eliminated. 
Figure 5-11 shows a single architecture that exhibits the functionality described. In 
Figure 5-11A the top level architecture is shown, while Figure 5-11B shows the 
selector block. The self-feedback and successor feedback are shown as 'SFB' and 
'FB' respectively. The data inputs, labelled 'DN' in Figure 5-IIA, also connect to the 
control input labelled 'CNTRL(N+2), in Figure 5-11B. 
The architecture selects data codes from the computation block or the storage output 
depending on the codes that it receives. The computation block outputs are selected if 
the parity of the IFIS cell data codes and the parity of the successor cell feedback are 
all even while the parity of the current cell output is odd, or visa-versa. Otherwise, the 
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current cell output is selected. 
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Figure 5-11 Combined decoder/selector architecture. 
Examination of Figure 5-118 shows that under fault-free conditions, when the parity 
of 'DN' is even, the path from the function to the selector output via the '0' 
multiplexer inputs is taken. Conversely, when the parity of'DN' is odd then 'A' is 
logic level '1' and the route via the '1' input of the output multiplexer is taken. Under 
all fault conditions the storage output is selected. 
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10 
SIORE 
8) 
CNJRll 
CNlRl2 
CNIRl(N+2) [g. ............. , i' :~J:~~ ~M~ll 
1 i 
err FRCM ______ .L! ____ .1 
STORE \. ____ ~ __ ~) 
N+2 MILTIPlEXERS 
Figure 5-12 Combined comparator/selector architecture. 
Cl 
10 SIORE 
Figure 5-12 shows an alternative architecture based on comparison rather than 
decoding. The labelling convention adopted in Figure 5-11 is also used in Figure 5-12. 
Figure 5-12A shows the top level architecture and Figure 5-128 shows the structure of 
the selector within Figure 5-12A. Under fault-free conditions, the parity of'DN' is the 
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same as the parity of 'FB' and is different from that of 'SFB'. This results in all 
signals with the prefix 'CNTRL' being set to zero, thus routing the computation block 
outputs to the store. 
Architecture Complexity Collapsed Production Protocol Protocol + 
SSAFaults Test Freeze 
Decoder/ 3(n+2) + 12pn+9n+ 12pn+9n 6pn+ 7n 6pn + 17n 
selector 6p(n+3) + 48p+ 17 +48p+17 +36p+ +38p+ 14 
«n+l)/2) 14 
Comparator / 6(n+2) + 12pn + 12n + 12pn +12n 6pn+ 8p 8pn+ 12p 
selector 6p(n+2) 24p+24 + 24p+24 +lln +22 + lln+23 
Table 5-9 Characteristics of the combined checker/selector architectures. 
The characteristics of the combined architectures were obtained using the same 
techniques as those previously described and are contained in Table 5-9. 
5.5.3 Summary of Transmission Control Techniques 
A number of different architectures have been presented and their characteristics 
described. To compare the design techniques in a quantitative way requires that a 
relationship be established between the number of dual-rail data inputs (n) and the 
number of dual-rail outputs from the computation block (p). Clearly not all Boolean 
functions can be scaled. However, the multiplier example used in section 5.4 has 2n 
inputs and 2n outputs. For the purposes of comparison, it is therefore assumed that the 
data transmission controllers are part of an IFIS cell containing such a multiplier 
structure. 
Figure 5-13 combines data from Table 5-6 to Table 5-9 inclusive and shows a 
comparison of the effects of scaling n on design complexity. In Figure 5-13 the 
complexities of the combined architectures, namely 'DEC_MUX' and 'CMP_MUX', 
are shown not to scale favourably. Conversely, the partitioned architectures scale in a 
similar way to one another in a linear fashion. 
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Complexity Comparisons for Data Transmission 
Controllers 
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Figure 5-13 Scaling of design complexity for the alternative architectures. 
Figure 5-14 follows the same labelling convention as that adopted in Figure 5-13. The 
maximum single stuck-at fault coverage for architectures based on comparison is 
shown to be limited to values of less than 100%. This is because of the inability to 
control internal circuit nodes independently even when access to design inputs is not 
restricted. 
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Figure 5-14 Maximum production test coverage. 
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Maximum Protocol SSA coverage 
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Figure 5-15 Maximum test coverage when restricted to protocol obeying vectors. 
Figure 5-15 shows the effect of scaling on the maximum single stuck-at fault coverage 
provided by protocol obeying vectors. This is a comparison of the on-line testability 
exhibited by the various scaled architectures. The best on-line testability is provided 
by the self-checking checker based architecture (which has a dedicated selector 
design). The lowest protocol SSA coverage is exhibited by those transmission 
controllers implemented using the combined (non-partitioned) architecture. 
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Figure 5-16 Maximum test coverage when restricted to protocol obeying vectors followed by 
an enforced freeze. 
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In addition to protocol obeying vectors, test coverage can be increased by initiating a 
system halt. This causes the IFIS cells within the system to freeze. Figure 5-16 shows 
the combined maximum single stuck-at fault coverage which results from maximum 
protocol potential followed by such a freeze. Figure 5-16 shows that the difference in 
SSA coverage between the architectures that employ partitioning, is less following a 
freeze that shown in Figure 5-15. 
5.6 CONCLUSIONS 
Comparison of four different techniques for designing the functional block within 
IFIS processing elements offers evidence that architectures based on duplication 
exhibit the highest on-line test coverage (100%) and the highest complexity. 
Additionally, this technique does not reduce the data throughput in comparison to 
conventional binary systems and does not restrict the range of applications that can be 
realised. This approach has the additional advantage over the other techniques in that 
it facilitates design construction due to its modular nature. Furthermore, it simplifies 
manufacturing test vector generation by permitting exploitation of vectors originally 
intended to test the conventional binary equivalent design. While the complexity 
overhead associated with this technique is unattractive, it is the only technique of 
those examined that fulfils the test coverage, application range and data throughput 
requirements specified earlier in this thesis. 
The degree of checking that can be achieved without resorting to periodic off-line 
testing reflects the level of confidence that can be placed in an on-line testable system 
at any point in time. It is clearly advantageous for this confidence level to be high. 
Comparison of alternative techniques for achieving data flow control, based on 
incoming data validity, show that specific architectures based on comparators are not 
100% testable even when unrestricted access is afforded to cell input/outputs. For an 
on-line testable system to display such attributes is clearly unacceptable. 
Of those techniques that provide 100% production test coverage, the best compromise 
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between on-line test coverage and complexity is, perhaps surprisingly, not displayed 
by designs derived from a self-checking checker. This is because the selector circuitry 
required to utilise an SCC itself contains untestable nodes. Other techniques aimed at 
removing the single signal that controls data flow all result in significant complexity 
penalties in addition to an increase in the number of untestable nodes. 
Based on the above discussion, it would seem that a favourable compromise between 
design complexity and on-line test coverage (without the need for a production tester) 
is provided by the simple decoder and conventional multiplexer approach. While this 
does leave the possibility of a single point of failure (select signal), this need not 
become a weakness if the remainder of the IFIS computation block is code disjoint. 
This is because a non-codeword appearing at the computation block (cell) inputs 
results in a non-codeword cell output in this case. This is then detected by the 
neighbouring IFIS cell, causing a system halt. 
92 
CHAPTER SIX 
IFIS FEASIBILITY STUDY 
6.1 OBJECTIVES OF CHAPTER 
This investigation is the final investigation in a series that explores the influence on 
design characteristics imposed by the coding/protocol and structure adopted by the 
IFIS methodology. This investigation aims to: 
• Report the application of IFIS to a real-world design implemented in 
hardware. 
• Outline the design experiences associated with designing using IFIS. 
• Demonstrate the operation of the circuit both in fault-free mode and with a 
specific failure. 
• Compare the performance, complexity and fault coverage of the conventional 
and IFIS equivalent implementations. This empirically quantifies the 
characteristics of a combined system built upon the results of the previous 
two investigations. 
6.2 IFIS UART DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
To verify the methodology, a representative design task has been undertaken. The 
DART was considered to fulfill this role as it was both a reasonably complex design 
and also includes busses, state machines and registers, all of which are frequently used 
design elements. To obtain comparative data for designs implemented using the IFIS 
on-line test methodology, a DART has been realised in both conventional and IFIS 
forms in FPGA technology. A survey was performed and the features offered by 
commercially available DARTs were identified. The following generic functions were 
included in the DART design: 
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• 7 bit serial data with single start/stop bits 
• 1 bit even parity checking 
• ParitylFraming/Overrun error flag generation 
• Provision for external serial port clock 
• TransmitterlReceiver data buffers 
• Interrupt generation 
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Figure 6-1 Top level architecture of the UART. 
Figure 6-1 shows the control/data-flow graph of an IFIS UART. The UART shown in 
the figure and its behaviour were first defined by choosing from typical specifications 
of commercially available designs. Both versions of the UART were developed using 
this architecture. Figure 6-1 shows that the generic UART is partitioned into three 
blocks, namely the receiver, transmitter and controller. An outline of the function of 
each block now follows. 
6.2.1 Receiver 
The task of the receiver is to receive a serial bitstream in the form: start bits, data, 
parity information and stop bits and store the contained data until it is retrieved by the 
host CPU. The arrival of new data is signalled to the receiver by a transition from a 
sequence of stop bits to a start bit value at the serial data input. Following the 
reception of data, the receiver generates a set of error flags, intended for use by the 
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source of the bitstream. These flags reflect the validity of the data received by the 
receiver and may be used to trigger a re-transmission of the data if required. 
Simultaneously, the receiver communicates its status to the internal UART controller 
using asynchronous handshaking. This form of communication was required because 
the clock domain associated with the serial bitstream (and hence the receiver) is 
different from the clock domain associated with the host CPU (CPU clock domain) 
and controller. Received data words are stored in a First In First Out (FIFO) data 
buffer of depth 3. The receiver FIFO was implemented as 3 synchronous registers: 
each a self-contained IFIS cell in the IFIS UART. These are shown as PREG_l, 
PREG_2 and PREG_3 in Figure 6-1. 
6.2.2 Transmitter 
The task of the transmitter is to take data words placed in its data buffer by the host 
CPU and convert them into a serial bitstream of standard format including start bits, 
data, parity information and stop bits. The parallel data lies within the CPU clock 
domain while the bitstream exists in the serial clock domain. The status of the 
transmitter is communicated to the internal UART controller using asynchronous 
handshaking. When no new data is placed into the transmitters data buffer it generates 
a bitstream at the serial data output containing only stop bits. PREG _0 represents the 
transmitters data buffer in Figure 6-1. I 
6.2.3 Controller 
This circuit controls data flow within the UART. This comprises two sub-tasks: 
Namely receiver FIFO management and transmitter FIFO management. Receiver 
FIFO management is to ensure that data is removed from the FIFO when the host 
CPU has read data from it and to inform the receiver that space exists in the FIFO. 
This occurs as a result of the CPU servicing an interrupt generated by the UART 
controller. Once the data has been removed from the receiver FIFO, the controller 
must also issue control signals that cause the data inside the FIFO to be moved. Thus 
allows more data to be added by the receiver and more data to be read by the CPU. 
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Transmitter FIFO management involves requesting new data from the host CPU when 
the FIFO is empty, generating the correct control signals to cause the FIFO to load 
data when supplied by the CPU, and informing the transmitter that data is in the FIFO. 
The controller issues different levels of interrupt requests to the host CPU depending 
on the data content of the receiver and transmitter FIFOs. 
6.2.4 Provision for IFIS 
In the IFIS UART, it was necessary to provide translation between IFIS codes and 
conventional external data and vice-versa because serial data arrives in a normal 
binary format. It was decided to place these translator units in the receiver and 
transmitter so that conventional data is transmitted/received via the serial ports. This 
allows the state machines controlling the Serial-In-Parallel-Out (SIPO) and Parallel-
In-Serial-Out (PISO) registers to follow the same sequences of state transitions in both 
designs. These local state machines are implemented in a conventional manner. This 
is because no advantage is gained by implementing them in IFIS. Data is controlled 
within the UART by the controller which operates in parallel with the other state 
machines communicating with it using a handshaking protocol. If the controller halts 
due to a failure detected by the IFIS protocol, it is unable to generate an acknowledge 
signal. Since the local state machines do not receive the acknowledge signal they 
retain their current state and cannot direct data movement within the serial ports. 
Following the definition of block specification, the receiver, transmitter and controller 
blocks were designed independently following the IFIS structure selected in chapter 5 
whenever IFIS cells were employed. The function blocks within each of the IFIS cells 
were designed such that single faults could only affect one bit of each (t,f) pair. This 
was necessary to ensure that the IFIS protocol would be disrupted following 
stimulation of a single fault. 
6.2.5 Design Issues 
The main issues associated with the using the IFIS methodology are design 
implementation and design verification. These issues are discussed below. 
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6.2.5.1 Design implementation 
There are a number of ways in which IFIS designs can be implemented. The key to 
implementing IFIS designs is to exercise control over the structure of the netlist such 
that the computation block is of the generic structure shown in Figure 6-2. 
'------' 
Conventional f--< 
'f bits Function 'f bits 
• 
L~ T 
r~ 
• 
't' bits Conventional 't' bits 
Function 
Figure 6-2 IFIS computation architecture. 
Duplication is used because it is considered to be the most effective generic method 
for checking logical operations [Avizienis71a, PateI82]. This block structure is partly 
based on an idea that appeared in [Reynolds78] and [Shedletsky78] for the purposes 
of error detection and error masking respectively. This structure should be used 
because 
• No single fault internal to the function can affect both rails of the dual-rail pair 
carrying an IFIS code. Active faults therefore always result in non-codeword 
output and violate the protocol. 
• It is generic making it easy to understand and simple to implement. Both of 
these properties result in minimised design time and hence reduced cost. 
• A direct structural relationship between the functionality contained in the 
conventional and IFIS implementations is established. This permits design 
structures of known characteristics to be used and facilitates test pattern 
generation for off-line testing. 
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The two primary factors that influence the final design structure are: 
• Design description 
• Design manipulation 
When using an HDL in conjunction with the IFIS methodology, a key issue is the 
level of abstraction to use. A high level of abstraction is used to describe the 
behaviour of a design when its structure is unimportant. The fault detecting abilities of 
IFIS cells, as with most other design for test techniques, depend on the circuit 
structure. To obtain the structure for the function part of an IFIS cell, shown in Figure 
6-2, requires that the conventional function be realised and then placed using a 
structural description. This technique must also be applied at the IFIS cell level if the 
cells are to be structured as described in chapter five. The style of description applied 
to the conventional function within the IFIS cell is left to the discretion of the designer 
for who additional control over the structure may not be required. It is, however 
suggested that it be identical to that used in the original conventional implementation 
so that advantage can be taken of existing test vectors/design verification. 
Design manipulation occurs during optimisation. It can traditionally be applied at any 
level of the design hierarchy and results in the loss of hierarchical structure below the 
level to which it is applied. To maintain the structure of IFIS cells, a pre-requisite if 
the fault detection properties are to be maintained, the design manipulation should 
only be performed at the level of the conventional function block in both the 
conventional and IFIS implementations. The selector logic is made from paralleled 
standard cell multiplexors and thus optimisation brings no benefit. A similar 
reasoning applies to the storage section of the IFIS cell. The protocol checking logic 
can be optimised as long as the resultant structure is not an exclusive-or tree which for 
checking the IFIS protocol is not 100% testable. This is due to the internal fanout of 
the checker inputs. 
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6.2.5.2 Verification 
Since there is a strong structural relationship between IFIS and conventional 
implementations, vector sets designed for functional verification (and structural 
testing) of both implementations should be strongly related. By ensuring that the same 
data sequences are applied to the primary inputs of both implementations, the same 
sequence of internal states occur in each under fault free conditions. The advantages 
of this are: 
• Once confidence is gained in the correctness of a conventional design using a 
functional vector set, the investment already made in the vector set can be 
exploited when verifying the IFIS design. 
• Vectors designed to test the structural integrity of the conventional 
implementation can be manipulated to test the structure of the corresponding 
IFIS implementation, thus reducing the costs of test vector generation for use 
during production test. 
The UART designs were verified by applying input vectors to software models of the 
UARTs written in the 'c' programming language and storing the responses. The 
vector sets were related in the way described above. Figure 6-3 shows the design flow 
used to generate the stimulus files for the UARTS. 
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Figure 6-3 The flow used to generate verification patterns for the UARTs. 
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Examination of Figure 6-3 shows that serial data is applied to both the IFIS and to the 
conventional UARTs directly. This data is intended for application to the serial port of 
the UARTs. Serial data ports were not implemented using IFIS coding for the reasons 
described in section 6.2.4. However the data generated for application to the parallel 
data port (to/from the host CPU) requires translation prior to application to the IFIS 
UART because the parallel port is implemented using the IFIS protocol in the IFIS 
UART. 
When simulating, vector files containing input vector sequences and expected outputs 
were read by VHDL testbenches and the simulation responses compared to the 'c' 
model responses. When the designs were placed in FPGAs, the Labview enviromnent 
mnning on a PC was able to apply the same vector files as those applied to the 
simulations and use them to check the FPGA responses. Figure 6-4 shows the 
similarities between verification of the design data base and the verification of the 
hardware implementations. 
SIMULATION HARDWARE 
I 
STIMULUS 
FILE 
/ ~ 
DESIGN VHDL LABVIEW FPGA 
DATA TESTBENCH TEST CONTAINING 
BASE ENVIRONMENT DESIGN 
I PASS/FAIL I I PASS/FAIL I I 
I 
Figure 6-4 Design verification in the software and hardware environments. 
Using this method of test pattern application following the generation of a reference 
test response set, it was possible to generate and apply large vector sets which 
increased confidence in the similarity in behaviour between the 'c' based models and 
the VHDL sourced design. 
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6.2.5.3 Fault injection 
To demonstrate a fault condition, a means for faultinjection was added to the UART 
design. Figure 6-5 shows the position of the injected fault, marked by the symbol a, 
within the controller block which itself comprises two IFIS cells. The insert to Figure 
6-5 shows the logic for injecting the example fault under control ofDATA]LT. 
FEEDBACK: .+=::::::::~--~::::::::::~~·FEEDBACK 
OUT '" . IN 
IFIS DATA ._ ..... -1 
IN 
IFISCELL 
A 
IFIS CELL 
B 
1--'" IFIS DATA ..-__ _ 
• OUT 
Figure 6-5 The injected/ault, marked by a, activated in the controller. 
Since the error detection abilities of dual structures are well known, this fault was 
chosen to demonstrate the effect of an error occurring at an IFIS cell boundary. The 
equivalent ofa stuck-at 0 fault can be applied to a single bit of the code generated at the 
output of the cell labelled IFIS cell A. Stimulation of this fault results in a non-
monotonic transition between the last value and the current value held on the affected 
dual-rail pair. 
6.3 RESULTS 
This section contains the results obtained from implementing the UART using the two 
design methodologies. The design flow used was that from VHDL through synthesis 
and optimisation, then finally to XiIinx netIist. The XiIinx netIist was placed in the 
FPGA, using the XiIinx software provided. 
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6.3.1 Faulty and Fault-free Operation 
Table 6-1 relates the signal names occurring in Figure 6-6 and Figure 6-7 to the 
interfacial descriptions shown on Figure 6-1 with the exception of the clock signals, . 
reset request line and test mode select, which were omitted from the figure for reasons 
of clarity. 
Signals Signal Descriptions 
Global and Serial clock signals 
RRQ, TMS Reset request and Test Mode Select 
lACK, IRQO, IRQ1 Controller - host CPU handshaking 
PAR ERR, FRAM ERR, 
- -
Parity, Frame and Overrun errors 
OVRN_ERR 
SDI, SDO Serial Data In / Out 
Parallel Data from UART to CPU (IFIS coded) 
IFIS Feedback from CPU to UART 
Parallel Data from CPU to UART (IFIS coded) 
IFIS Feedback from UART to CPU 
Table 6·1 Signal names and descriptions. 
Figure 6-6 shows the FPGA containing the IFIS UARToperating under normal 
conditions. Figure 6-7 shows what happens when a fault is introduced which affects the 
output of an IFIS cell, in this case a cell inside the controller. 
LK 
"0 
so, 
lACK 
"' FB_T_IN 
FB_F_IN 
X_T_BUS 
X_F_BUS 
DATA_f"LT 
'DO ~"~""~"r----------------------------c ______ ~ 
'0D 
IR01 
PAR_ERR 
FRAM_ERR 
VRN_ERR 
RX_T_BUS 
RX_F'_BUS 
F'B_T_DUT 
FB_F_DUT 
lK "K 10K "K >OK 31K "K 41K 
Figure 6-6 The IFIS UART under normal operation. 
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The arrows that appear on Figure 6-6 and Figure 6-7 denote the following: 
1. The IFIS data bus from the CPU carrying IFIS coded data to the UART. 
2. The IFIS data bus to the CPU carrying IFIS coded data from the UART. 
3. The activation of the fault at a by signal DATA_FLT. 
4. The deactivation of the fault. 
Examination of Figure 6-7 shows that following fault injection, and excitation, the 
RX_T_BUS and RX]_BUS collectively halt. That means that both busses retain 
data. In this case, the fault was not excited by incoming data immediately following 
injection. This is evident by the delay in halting of the RX_T_BUS and RX]_BUS 
outputs. Once halted, this status remains even after the removal of the fault. 
CC< 
"0 
'" lACK 
8_T_IN 
8_"_IN 
x_T_BUS 
"_F'_BUS 
ATA_f'LT 
00 
1 ______________________ ~r__oL ________ ~r__oL ________ __ 
'00 ~~i===r===============~±=======r=====~~~====== ' j:;ooooooo 
AR_ERR 
R"M_ERR 
VRN_ERR 
RM_T_BUS 
RX_F'_BUS 
Fa_T_OUT 
FB_f'_OUT 
",'.IL''''UU'''''' 
" 
Figure 6-7 The IFIS UART under an injected fault condition. 
'" 
4 
Under normal conditions this halting would also trigger the CPU to no longer supply 
data via the TX_T_BUS and TX_F_BUS, however the worst case scenario occurs 
when this halting is ignored by the host CPU which continues to supply data. This is 
the case in Figure 6-7. 
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6.3.2 Complexity and Performance 
To obtain comparative results for pure IFIS circuitry and conventional circuitry, the 
controller was implemented purely in IFIS. For completeness comparative results for all 
blocks with respect to complexity and performance have been included. 
Table 6-2 shows the comparative complexities for the two implementations of the 
UART. The measures are of gate counts rather than configurable logic blocks (CLBs), 
which are the standard measure of complexity for Xilinx FPGAs, because the 
resolution is higher. The complexities were extracted using 'Logsyn' under the 
Intergraph v12.01.2 design suite. 
Implementation 
Block Name Conventional IFIS Relative 
(Std. Cells) (Std. Cells) Complexity 
Controller 135 301 2.23 
Receiver 183 375 2.05 
Transmitter 87 148 1.70 
Table 6-2 Complexities of the three top level UART design blocks. 
Examination of data relating to the controller in Table 6-2 reveals that the IFIS 
implementation is a 2.23 times as large as the conventional counterpart. This can be 
attributed to a combination of function duplication, as shown in Figure 6-2, and the 
overhead incurred by the necessity of having transmission control logic. The overhead 
related to the checker logic is directly proportional to the number of IFIS cell inputs, 
while the overhead associated to the selector is directly proportional to the number of 
IFIS cell outputs. 
Block Name Maximum Maximum Relative 
Frequency (MHz) Frequency (MHz) Performance 
Conventional IFIS 
Controller 12.0 9.0 0.75 
Receiver 9.4 9.4 1.00 
Transmitter 18.5 16.1 0.87 
Table 6-3 Performance of the three top level UART design blocks. 
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Table 6-3 shows the maximum frequencies of each of the design blocks according to 
the back-annotated netlist data-base. The target technology was a Xilinx 4013 FPGA 
(theoretical maximum frequency of 50MHz). It was not possible to verify these results 
by applying test vectors to the FPGA at such high speed due to limitations imposed 
by the PC based test bed. Since IFIS uses a saturated dual-rail code (as described in 
chapter four) and data changes during every clock cycle, its data rate is the same as 
the code rate which is 1 data state/clock. 
Examination of data relating to the controller in Table 6-3 reveals that the IFIS 
implementation is 0.75 as fast as the conventional counterpart. This can be attributed 
to the additional signal delay from conventional function outputs to storage inputs by 
the additional exclusive-or gate, shown in each F bit path in Figure 6-2, and the 
selector circuitry described in chapter five. 
6.3.3 Fault Coverage 
For the purpose of obtaining comparable fault coverage information, the 'c' models 
described in section 6.2.5.2 were developed to reflect the top level partitioning. Thus 
each UART model comprises models of the three major sub-blocks, each with 
interface lists matching their hardware counterparts. The interface lists of the 
conventional and IFIS controllers differ due to the coding used in the IFIS 
implementation. However, the control sequences issued by each controller under 
similar input conditions result in the same data flow in both UARTs. 
Using the models it was possible to extract the data sequences occurring at the 
controller interfaces from identical top level data sequences applied to each of the two 
UART implementations. Standalone netlists of the two controllers were separately 
subjected to these local vector sequences and the cumulative fault coverage for each 
sequence calculated using the TDX fault simulator. In IFIS systems, any logical 
deviation reaching the IFIS cell boundary compromises the IFIS protocol thus 
triggering a system halt. For this reason, the fault coverage measured at the controller 
interface is representative of the on-line coverage which would be exhibited if the 
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UART were subjected to the same top level data sequence. 
The best case and worst case fault coverage predictions for the IFIS design can be 
approximated from the cumulative coverage observed for the conventional 
implementation. This is because the structural relationship between the two 
implementations is known to be of the fonn shown in Figure 6-2. The minimum 
predicted coverage corresponds to the case where no cumulative fault coverage is 
expected within the transmission control logic shown in Figure 5-9 and Figure 6-2. 
The maximum predicted fault coverage would occur if the gates within the 
. transmission control logic are 100% tested and contribute to the overall coverage. 
60r-------------------------------------~ 
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Figure 6-8 Comparison of SSA fault coverage. 
Figure 6-8 shows the cumulative fault coverage exhibited by the conventional 
controller, the maximum (minimum) predicted coverage assuming 100% (0%) fault 
coverage of the additional circuitry in the IFIS implementation and the observed 
coverage in the IFIS implementation. It is important to note that it is the relative 
coverage observed in the IFIS system with respect to the predicted IFIS values (and 
not the absolute values) that characterises the testability of the IFIS control circuitry. 
Following the application of approximately 1800 vectors, a fault was injected, and the 
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observed fault coverage in the IFIS controller is seen to rise correspondingly. 
Unlike off-line testing, the test time is infinite in the on-line test environment. 
However, comparison of the fault coverages shown in Figure 6-8 (which covers a 
finite period of time) shows that the increase in complexity incurred in the IFIS 
implementation is offset by the ability to provide on-line testing with a high fault 
detection ability. Furthermore, the additional complexity introduced by duplication 
and data flow control logic is shown to be well tested by vectors which were not 
specifically targeted for that purpose. 
6.4 SUMMARY 
The feasibility of the IFIS methodology has been explored using a contemporary IC 
design. A UART was chosen for implementation because it contains examples of 
features typical of state of the art designs, namely: Serial to parallel converters, 
parallel to serial converters, state machines and synchronous registers. 
The UART was implemented on FPGA and its operation was verified using vectors 
generated by an independent functional model. In addition to functional verification, 
the design was characterised with respect to data throughput, complexity and 
behaviour under fault conditions. Additionally, a method to assess on-line test 
coverage was derived and applied to the design. This enabled the assessment of the 
on-line test coverage enjoyed by an IFIS state machine buried deep within the UART 
design. 
6.5 CONCLUSIONS 
From the results obtained, it can be concluded that the concept of the IFIS 
methodology is sound and additionally, that the halting mechanism provided by IFIS 
successfully provides error detection, error flagging and error management. 
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Furthennore, the combination of protocol/encoding scheme selected in chapter four 
with the cell structure derived in chapter five results in systems that: 
• Display the same data throughput rate as their conventional binary equivalent 
systems while supporting umnodified data flow during error-free operation. 
• Display a high level of on-line test coverage. Despite the increase in 
complexity, a substantial fraction of the additional hardware required for the 
implementation of IFIS designs is tested concurrently with the hardware that it 
protects. 
• Provide the intended pennanent halting behaviour under fault conditions. 
• Do not pennit erroneous data to propagate to primary system outputs. 
As expected, the complexity of IFIS designs is more than double that of their 
equivalent binary implementation. Two factors affect the complexity of IFIS designs, 
namely: 
• The duplication required for providing a dynamic functional reference. This is 
a direct consequence of incorporating enough flexibility into the methodology 
so as not to restrict the range of applications to which it may be applied. 
• The overhead required for checking infonnation communicated between IFIS 
processing elements. The simplicity of the dual-rail-coding scheme allows this 
dedicated hardware to be built in a modular way, thus resulting in a predictable 
complexity for checking a specific number of data bits. 
Based on the above discussion, it can be concluded that to minimise the complexity 
penalty associated with IFIS, maximum functionality should be included within each 
IFIS processing element. 
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FAILURE DIAGNOSIS IN IFIS 
7.1 OBJECTIVES OF CHAPTER 
This investigation assesses the utility of knowing the sequence in which system 
outputs halt for performing failure diagnosis in IFIS systems. The objectives of this 
investigation are to: 
• Develop a strategy for failure diagnosis in IFIS 
• Identify the limitations of the strategy 
• Describe the practical application of the diagnosis technique 
• Demonstrate the application of the technique to hardware 
• Empirically identify the practical limitations of the technique 
• Explain the results obtained from the technique application 
7.2 MOTNATlON 
Failure diagnosis is useful to the IC manufacturer because its output can be used to 
identify faulty regions within designs. When a number of manufactured ICs fail in the 
same region this can often be attributed to manufacturing process problems. In some 
cases, it is possible to adjust the physical implementation of future versions of the 
same IC design to reduce the chance of problems occurring in the same region 
[S~erwani951. 
Any mechanism that assists with failure diagnosis of repairable systems has the 
potential to increase system availability by reducing the time taken to locate a 
replaceable unit. 
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On-line testable designs inherently exhibit some of the properties that are needed to 
perform failure diagnosis. The common tasks of monitoring, modelling and partial 
analysis, can be identified by comparison of Table 7-1 and Table 7-2 that refer to 
representative diagnosis and on-line test techniques respectively. 
Expert 'Golden' Dictionary Consistency Elimination 
System Device (Aitken95) checking [Cox88) 
[Bernard94) [Purcell88) [Girard95) 
Monitoring. Device Device Device Device Device 
outputs outputs outputs outputs outputs 
Modelling Model Device used Model Individual Component/ 
contained in as reference described component connection 
rule base in matrix models models 
Analysis System Differences Quality of Localise Analyse 
traverses rule highlighted match is inconstancy history of 
base assessed node values 
Hypothesis Candidate list Physical Candidate Candidate Candidate 
(probable region list list (probable list (possible 
causes) (probable causes) causes) 
causes) 
Table 7-1 Classification of activities for different methods offault diagnosis. 
In Table 7-1, the tasks of monitoring, modelling, analysis and hypothesis are mapped 
to the appropriate activity for specific diagnosis techniques. Table 7-2 maps the 
techniques of monitoring, modelling and analysis to tasks appropriate to on-line 
testing. 
Information Hardware Time 
Redundancy Redundancy Redundancy 
Monitoring Design block Design block Design Block 
outputs outputs outputs 
Modelling Model Spare hardware Previous 
contained in used as behaviour used as 
code reference reference 
Analysis Design block Design block Design block 
PasslFail PasslFail PasslFail 
Table 7-2 Classification of activities for different methods of on-line testing. 
The high proportion of activities common to both on-line testing and to failure 
diagnosis suggest that on-line testable systems can themselves assist in system level 
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diagnosis, thus reducing the need for external intervention. IFIS systems must 
therefore also be capable of assisting in the diagnosis of system failure. 
The halting property associated with IFIS designs distinguishes them from the other 
on-line test techniques. IFIS inherently performs error management following error 
detection. The halting mechanism that provides this feature is triggered following 
error detection at an IFIS cell input. The cell that detects an error condition ceases 
processing, thus causing an error condition to appear on monitored inputs of 
immediately neighbouring cells. In this way, halting of IFIS cells progresses 
throughout the entire IFIS system, progressing away from the error source at the rate 
of one cell per system clock cycle until all primary system inputs and outputs are 
reached. The way in which IFIS systems halt following error detection suggests that 
diagnostic information be contained in the halting sequence of system outputs. This 
investigation assesses the ability to perform failure diagnosis within IFIS designs 
based on the halting sequence ofIFIS system outputs. 
7.3 EXPECTATIONS OF FAILURE DIAGNOSIS IN IFIS 
While the inherent error management characteristic of IFIS systems results in 
diagnostic information, it also affects the range of diagnostic techniques that can be 
applied to them. 
7.3.1 Inherent Influences ofIFIS 
The effects of preventing erroneous data from being processed/propagated are 
associated with a number of advantages and disadvantages in the context of failure 
diagnosis. The advantages associated with this mechanism are: 
• The activities of monitoring, modelling and analysis reduce the workload on 
external failure diagnosis equipment. This facilitates failure diagnosis in the 
manufacturing environment and can be exploited to provide in-the-field 
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diagnostic capability with minimal external intervention. This must result in 
increased system availability. 
• There is no need to re-stimulate a known faulty design with tests that are 
designed to test for specific fault conditions. 
• The information required to perform diagnosis is simplified by referencing 
information rather than using actual data values. Information de-referencing 
was used to perform diagnostic simplification in [Aitken95]. 
• Failure diagnosis of state machines using explicit post test diagnosis is feasible 
in IFIS because of the abstract nature of the available information. Explicit 
post test diagnosis is commonly restricted to combinational designs [Maly91 , 
Millman91 ,Somayula93,Chang70, Tsiang62]. 
The disadvantages associated with the halting mechanism are: 
• It makes IFIS designs unsuitable candidates for multiple defect diagnosis. 
Multiple defect diagnosis can be performed on conventional binary designs by , 
using implicit methods based on analysing results obtained from the 
application of predetermined test vector sets (Post test diagnosis) [Aitken91, 
Aitken92,Millman94,Waikuk89]. Additionally, implicit diagnosis can be 
performed on conventional designs using interactive test vector selection 
(Diagnostic testing) [Cox88, Abromov80]. In both cases, multiple examples of 
failure must occur before diagnosis is considered to be achieved. IFIS systems 
stop on the first occurrence of error (SOFE). 
• When diagnosing IFIS systems, the resolution achievable for single defect 
diagnosis cannot be guaranteed when using explicit diagnostic testing because 
of the SOFE characteristic of IFIS. Explicit diagnostic testing requires less 
storage capacity than that required for post test diagnosis [Girard95, 
Bernard94,Brugnoni93, Favila91,Purce1l88, Genes84, Kautz68, Chang65]. For 
this reason this class of techniques is considered preferable for performing 
single defect diagnosis in conventional designs. 
The listed disadvantages are generally associated with defect analysis that results in 
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information useful for adjusting the manufacturing process. This level of resolution is 
not necessary for performing diagnosis within repairable systems. 
7.3.2 Expected Limitations on Resolution Based on Halting Sequence 
. The purposes of identifying the limitations associated with failure diagnosis based on 
the hal ting sequence ofIFIS system outputs are twofold, namely: 
• To discover the potential usefulness of the teclmique. 
• To identify design restrictions that may be required to maximise the abilities of 
the diagnosis technique. 
An informal discussion of the expected limitations in diagnostic resolution based on 
the halting sequence ofIFIS primary outputs is presented below. 
The protocol adopted for IFIS designs was selected in chapter four. The selected 
protocol is inelastic and halts permanently following fault detection. The effect of the 
outputs of a specific cell signalling an error are to initiate a halt which propagates 
throughout an IFIS system at the rate of one cell per clock cycle. Halting is bi-
directional. This means that IFIS cells connected to primary inputs, in addition to 
those connected to primary outputs, cease to process when the protocol is no longer 
. satisfied. This means that once a cell initiates a halt a complete system halt follows. 
The most complex diagnosis tasks are those where the minimum diagnostic 
information is available. To satisfy the IFIS protocol the system feedback output 
(coming from a primary input cell) must be monitored in addition to the output of the 
primary output cell. In this way IFIS systems provide access to a minimum of two 
system outputs. 
It can be inferred that a path must exist from each primary input to each primary 
output via any internal cell. If this were not the case certain cells would exist for 
which local error detection would not cause a complete system halt. When 
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considering the number of paths existing between an IFIS primary input cell and an 
IFIS primary output cell, two scenarios exist, namely: 
• There is only one path 
• There are multiple paths 
7.3.2.1 Single path scenario 
Figure 7-1 shows a generic IFIS chain (as presented in chapter four) where only one 
path exists between a primary input cell and a primary output cell which are separated 
by N cells. 
The structure of the design influences the time taken (in clock cycles) for data to 
progress through the design. Therefore, the position of each cell in the data path is a 
fixed number of cells (clock cycles) from both the primary input cell and the primary 
output cell. Thus the time taken (path length, measured in clock cycles) for an 
initiated halt to become apparent at the primary input and primary output cells is 
unique for each initiating cell. 
PRIMARY PRIMARY 
INPUT CELL OUTPUT CELL 
~..Jr::::;::;::::;;:;I~-:,:::-~;:r-:;;-::.:-;-::.~,-~I- -::'"i';: ~.:; --G ----~: ~z DATA DATA A .' ,.L __ +, ,.L ___ ~ .-,~. --'_ ." IN ' __ • ' __ • ' __ • our 
N cells 
I .. . , 
Figure 7-IAn IFIS chain where only one halting path exists from the primary input cell to the 
primary output cell. 
When monitoring primary system outputs, the absolute time taken from internal error 
detection to primary output halting is not available. The available information is the 
difference in time taken between the halting of the first primary output and the halting 
of the others. In the scenario shown in Figure 7-1, all cells can be distinguished using 
the reduced information. 
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7.3.2.2 Multiple path scenario 
Where multiple paths exist between two cells a minimum of one closed loop exists 
between the input cell and the output cell. Once a loop exists, it is not possible to 
distinguish between all cells in the loop if only two cell outputs are monitored. 
Where one closed loop exists, two halting paths exist from each cell to each primary 
output. Figure 7-2 shows a simple generic multiple-path IFIS system. In this system, a 
clockwise path exists from each cell to both the primary input cell and to the primary 
output cell. Similarly, an anti-clockwise path exists from each cell to both the primary 
input cell and to the primary output cell. This is due to the bi-directional 
communication used in IFIS systems. 
DATA 
IN 
PRIMARY 
INPUT CEll 
PRIMARY 
OUTPUT CELl 
r--------F=====~- -----, L_ l....,.. - -, I - -,J 
... 1 __ J ,"--------+1 
~ __ I 
, 
, 
======L_~=====I-;=====~_ ------, t .r'" - - I , r- - - I I ,.. - - I - - I 
..,.. I I L_)o, J..,; l_" I I L.J 
... ' __ +, ,---+' ~ 
~ - _, I I I I 
, 
1 , 
: Ncells , : 2(K) cells : 
,Ill • i i III • i 
DATA 
OUT 
Figure 7-2 Generic IFIS system where two paths exist between cell A and cell Z. 
The inelastic nature of the protocol dictates that the length of all paths from the 
primary input cell to the primary output cell must either be identical or differ by an 
even number of cells. Referring to Figure 7-2, K can be zero or any integer. The 
ability to distinguish between cells is described using examples. 
Example 1: K=O 
Figure 7-3 shows an example IFIS system of the type shown in Figure 7-2 where N=3 
and K=O. In this example, the path lengths from cell A to cell Z are equal in length. 
For clarity, the IFIS feedback and data have been combined and denoted as bi-
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directional arrows on the figure. Cells are shown as circles. 
PRIMARY 
FAULT DIAGNOSIS IN IFIS 
PRIMARY 
OUTPUT CELL 
0· DATA OUT 
Figure 7-3 An example IFIS system where two paths of equal length exist between the 
primary input cell and the primary output cell. 
While cell BI is distinguishable from cell Cl and cell DI, it is not distinguishable 
from cell B2. Similarly, cell C I is not distinguishable from cell C2. This is due to the 
symmetry exhibited in the paths. 
Example 2: K=2 
Figure 7-4 shows an example IFIS system where N=3 and K=2 using the same 
notation as in Figure 7-3. In this example the multiple path lengths from the primary 
input cell, A to the primary output cell, I, are different depending on the route taken. 
PRIMARY 
INPUT CELL 
---tAf-r-+--''---
DATA IN 
DATA OUT 
Figure 7-4 An example IFIS system where two paths of unequal length exist between the 
primary input cell and the primary output cell. 
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It was stated above that each path length from the primary input cell to the primary 
output cell (such as that shown in Figure 7-4) is identical or the path lengths differ by 
an even number of cells. This implies that the loop length, given by the number of 
cells contained in the closed loop, is always even. This further implies that for any 
monitored cell in the loop (either the primary input cell or the primary output cell) 
there exists only one cell at the maximum path length from it. In Figure 7-4 cell '0' is 
the furthest away from cell 'A' and cell 'c' is the farthest cell from cell '1'. 
Halts initiated at cells C, B, A, L, K and J propagate via the clockwise path to cell!. 
Similarly, halts initiated by cells C, D, E, F, 0 and H propagate via the anti-clockwise 
path to cell!. This is because the IFIS protocol ensures that cell halting propagates via 
the fastest (shortest) path. A similar observation can be made for the halt propagation 
paths to cell A. Further examination of Figure 7-4 shows that when cells C, B and A 
initiate a system halt, it is propagated to both the output of the primary input cell and 
to the primary output cell in the same ( clockwise) direction. This makes these cells 
indistinguishable as the initiator of a system halt. The reason that these cells are 
indistinguishable is that it is the difference between the halting times of system 
outputs which is observable. Fault diagnosis is based on this information alone. 
CELL ABSOLUTE ABSOLUTE OBSERVED OBSERVED 
INITIATING HALT TIME HALT TIME HALT TIME HALT TIME 
HALT OF CELLA OF CELL I OF CELLA OF CELL I 
A 1 5 I 5 
B 2 6 I 5 
C 3 7 1 5 
D 4 6 1 3 
E 5 5 1 I 
F 6 4 3 1 
0 7 3 5 1 
H 6 2 5 I 
I 5 1 5 1 
J 4 2 3 1 
K 3 3 1 1 
L 2 4 I 3 
Table 7-3 Observable primary halting sequence of the system shown in Figure 7-4 mapped to 
the cells which initiate each halt. 
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Table 7-3 shows the halting behaviour of the primary system outputs when halts are 
initiated at the cells shown in Figure 7-4. Examination of Table 7-3 further' reveals 
that cell A and cell E are indistinguishable. Similarly, cells L and J are 
indistinguishable from cells D and F respectively. This is due to symmetry which was 
also apparent in the example with K=O. 
7.3.3 Summary of Expectations 
This section has demonstrated that the error detection/flagging mechanism used in 
IFIS designs can be used as a basis for fault diagnosis. Furthermore, resolution 
restrictions resulting directly from system architecture have been discussed using 
simple examples. System architecture was shown to influence the resolution 
attainable. Where only a single path exists from input cells to output cells resolution 
to the single cell can be achieved. Where multiple paths exist, this is not always 
possible. To predict the resolution restriction imposed by a typical system architecture 
requires knowledge of what represents a typical system. A first impression is obtained 
by applying the technique to the IFIS DART that was discussed in chapter six. 
7.4 ApPLICATION TO IFIS 
In current designs implemented on ICs, the trend has been an increase in the ratio of 
the physical areas occupied by interconnect to the area of functional circuitry in 
standard cell designs [Sherwani95]. For this reason, it is inappropriate to ignore the 
effects of defects which affect interconnections. It is appropriate to determine if logic 
affecting faults (those which cause IFIS designs to halt) can be correctly diagnosed 
using the halting sequence apparent at the primary system outputs. This section 
therefore explores the effects of connection faults in addition to empirically 
determining the diagnostic resolution obtainable within the IFIS equivalent of a 
commercial DART. 
The IFIS UART described in chapter six is used as a means to determine the ability to 
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perform diagnosis in IFIS systems under functional fault and connectivity fault 
conditions. The faults are induced and fault diagnosis is performed using an 
algoritlunically generated dictionarY of the type suggested in section 7.3.2. 
7.4.1 Fault Locations within the IFIS Structure 
There are a number of general fault positions within the IFIS structure that affect the 
protocol in the event of occurrence. These are shown by x,. in Figure 7-5 (which 
reflects the IFIS cell design technique used in the IFIS UART) where n is an integer. 
It should be noted that while the physical structure of an IFIS cell may result in the 
cell self feedback being downstream of the external feedback, this is unlikely because 
the self-feedback is internal to the cell. This means that there is no need to provide 
external access to the signal and therefore the shortest route from cell output to cell 
input can be used during cell design [Weste85]. This is not the case for the external 
feedback signals. 
.--------------
I 
I Guard 
Key: 
Data""" --+ 
F.ed-back +---
Cell boundary 
Xl 
Figure 7-5 Protocol affecting/ault sites. 
XI represents a fault within the cell (not in the checker logic) which affects the cell 
output and is equivalent to X2• Furthermore, faults XI and X4 are equivalent in terms 
of halting sequence as long as the first halt shown at the cell output is considered in a 
single cell system. In a multi-cell system the system will remain frozen when a fault 
occurs even in the case of a single fault at X4• X2 affects cell outputs and, by 
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implication, the feedbacks. X3 represents a fault occurring only on the self-feedback to 
the cell. X4 represents a fault that is equivalent to a combination of X, and X6. It must 
be noted that in all cases except that of X" cell outputs are affected with this model. 
X" however affects data to downstream elements without affecting the cell output 
itself. Based on this discussion, the unique fault types warranting examination are 
represented by those of type Xl> X3, X" X6 and X,. Having reduced the fault list, it 
remains to identifY relationships between the fault thus enabling the use of a simple 
algorithm to generate the dictionary. 
7.4.2 The Influence of Different Connection Faults on the Cell Halting Sequence 
The halting sequences presented in Table 7-3 assumed that the fault occurred 
upstream of the external cell feedback. Following the discussion presented in the 
previous section, this applies the model for an XI fault. Figure 7-6 shows the 
interconnection of three neighbouring IFIS cells with the fault positions associated 
with the current cell superimposed. 
r-------- --------
-I 1-------- - ~ I I W I L I ~ I I 3 f-s I I I ~ I 
"I I 
I 
I I 1 
I I I X, . "4 '0'''7' I I I I I I I 
--------_ .. 
---- ______ 1 L __ 
- - - --
PREDECESSOR CURRENT SUCCESSOR 
Data-flow --+-
Feed-back ...-
Cell boundary 
Figure 7-6 The context of each type of fault. 
Table 7-4 describes the effects of named faults occurring at the current cell with 
respect to the halting times based on an XI fault. 
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INITIATION TIME FOR Xl MODEL 
FAULT TYPE Predecessor Cell Current Cell Successor Cell 
Xl - I -
X3 - 2 -
X5 2 - -
X6 - - 2 
X7 - - 2 
Table 7-4 Application of the Xl model to describe differentfaults. 
An explanation of Table 7-4 now follows. Assume that time is incremented at the 
beginning of each cell processing cycle. A fault is considered to occur during the first 
cycle, hence an Xl fault in the current cell occurs time I. An X3 fault associated with 
the current cell directly affects the current cell. That is it causes the current cell to halt 
at time 2. Thus, the halting sequence associated with an X3 fault is the same as if it 
were an Xl fault delayed by I processing cycle. Similarly, an Xs fault associated with 
the current cell only directly affects the predecessor cell, which at time 2 halts. This is 
the equivalent of an Xl fault being sourced from the predecessor cell at time 2. Since 
all faults influence the halting sequence in a similar manner to that of the Xl fault with 
a modifier, only a description of the base algorithm is necessary. 
7.4.3 The Halting Dictionary Generation Algorithm 
The halting dictionary itself has already been defined to contain a complete set of 
halting sequences for all IFIS cells according to the models associated with Xl' X3, X s, 
X6 and X7 faults. With this in mind any alternative algorithms that may be compared 
must result in an identical dictionary output, and hence must have no influence on the 
resolution obtainable for fault diagnosis. The remaining commonly used metrics for 
comparison are those of CPU time and memory requirement. More appropriate to my 
algorithms are a comparison of the number of node assignments made and the 
memory requirement. Two algorithms for dictionary generation are informally 
discussed and the pseudo code for the better algorithm is presented. 
Node Oriented Generation: The dictionary is constructed by examining the effects of 
a halt occurring on the outputs of each IFIS cell within the system in turn. To achieve 
121 
CHAPTER SEVEN FAULT DIAGNOSIS IN IFIS 
this, each IFIS cell is in turn considered as the halt source and the halting times of the 
observable system outputs are calculated and stored. If n is the number of IFIS nodes 
in the complete system, then a minimum of n2 assignments are required to build the 
complete dictionary. 
Output Oriented Generation: The dictionary is constructed by calculating the time 
taken for the outputs of each IFIS cell in the system to affect each of the primary 
system outputs in turn. To acheive this, each primary system output is considered in 
turn, storing the halt propagation times associated with the outputs of each IFIS cell. 
If n is the number of IFIS nodes in the complete system and p the number of dual-rail 
primary system outputs, then a minimum of p. n assignments are required to build the 
complete dictionary. 
Both of the above algorithms are performed using models of the IFIS system and 
involve bi-directional path tracing. This may result in multiple attempted assignments 
associated with the outputs of each IFIS cell during calculation of each entry in the 
dictionary. It is for this reason that the actual number of assignments required to build 
the dictionary exceeds the minimum values provided above. To demonstrate the 
difference in efficiency of the two algorithms, each was applied to the same 
representation of the IFIS UART. The IFIS UART comprises 6 instances, 8 nets, 2 
primary inputs and 2 primary outputs. Table 7-5 summarises the requirements for 
dictionary compilation for both algorithms when performed on the IFIS UART. 
Node Oriented Output Oriented 
Model size (bytes) 4120 4120 
Temporary storage (bytes) 1032 1032 
N°' Of Node Assignments 82 20 
Table 7-5 Characteristics of application of the different algorithms to the IFIS UART design. 
In Table 7-5, the model size is the quantity allocated to storing the design structure 
within the computer memory. It is calculated at the time of reading the design data 
base. The data structures used for performing each algorithm were identical. The 
temporary storage is the quantity of memory needed to store temporary variables 
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during the calculation of the dictionary. Table 7-5 shows that the only difference 
between the two algorithms are the number of node assignments. In this case, more 
than 300% penalty is incurred by the node-oriented algorithm with no offsetting 
advantage. For completeness, the pseudo code for the Output oriented algorithm is 
provided. 
Pseudo code: 
Read netlist; 
for each primary system output 
node { 
set event time = 'I '; 
create two empty lists A and B; 
add the current node name to the list called A; 
label: while A is 
not empty { 
for each node 
listed inA { 
for each cell 
connected to 
the node { 
for each cell 
output node { 
associate the minimum value of 'event time + I' 
and it's already associated value of event time 
with the node and then add it's name to B; 
} 
} 
remove the node name from list A; 
} 
} 
increment event time; 
if B is not empty { 
swap list labels A & B and goto label; 
} 
if B is empty { 
store the event values associated with IFIS nodes 
for this primary output in the halt dictionary; 
} 
} 
write out the halt-dictionary table. 
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7.5 FAULT INJECTION IN THE IFIS UART 
The IFIS UART was used as a vehicle on which to perform fault diagnosis using real 
hardware. Figure 7-7 shows the IFIS view of the IFIS UART previously described in 
chapter 6. 
,--------------, 
.--------" ,,----------, ,----------, 
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Figure 7-7 The IFIS structure afthe IFIS UART. 
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For reasons of clarity the names in parentheses are those which are subsequently used 
to refer to the cells shown in Figure 7-7. The view shown in Figure 7-7 is that which 
is used by the algorithms described in section 7.4.3 to model the effects of faults 
within the system. 
The host CPU cells are not part of the UART design but have been shown in the 
figure because the host CPU must provide/accept signals conforming to the IFIS 
protocol to/from the UART. The IFIS cells containing the prefix P form the FIFOs 
while the IFIS cells containing the prefix C form the UART controller which oversees 
all data movement to/from and within the IFIS UART. The controller is the most 
complex section of the UART, and is the most distant from the IFIS primary 
inputs/outputs. For these reasons, the CTRLI IFIS cell, one of the 2 IFIS cells of the 
controller, was targeted for fault injection. 
Faults are injected in the IFIS UART (specifically the Cl IFIS cell) via four signal 
pins, namely functionjault, feedbackjault, intjeedbackjault, and datajault. Table 
7-6 shows the mapping between signal pin names on the UART and the associated 
fault locations that are affected with respect to the selected controller block. 
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PIN NAME FAULT 
Function fault XI 
Int feedback fault X3 
Feedback fault X, 
Data fault Xo 
Table 7-6 Mapping of signal pin names to faults as shown in Figure 7-5. 
To enable the pins to be referred to collectively, let us define a fault code to mean a 
. four bit 'Yord made from the bits applied to activate/disable the four pins controlling 
locations X6,X"X3 and XI (left to right). 
I CTRLl(Cl) 
FUNCTlON]AULT _____ ---l 
INUEEDBACK..FAULT--------...J 
FEEDBACK..FAULT :===========---.J D TA . C .. I boUndary --
Figure 7-8 Fault injection sites within the selected IFIS cell contained in the IFIS UART. 
Each of the named faults relates to the injection of a nominal stuck@zero fault 
affecting the data carrying bit of the IFIS bit pair. Figure 7-8 shows how the Cl cell 
has been adapted to permit fault injection within the controller. Faults are injected to 
the C I block by activating signals corresponding to appropriate faults. 
The fault injection signals are active low as shown in Figure 7-8. Advantage was 
taken of the multiple activation sites shown in Figure 7-8 to allow the UART to be 
subjected to fault combinations which are equivalent to other faults or for which no 
entry has been calculated in the dictionary. 
Table 7-7 shows fault injection codes and the fault description which applies to each 
code. 
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Fault Code Description . 
1111 No fault 
1110 Function fault 
1101 Internal feedback fault 
1100 XI dominates feedback fault - function fault 
1011 External feedback fault 
1010 XI dominates feedback fault - function fault 
1001 Multiple feedback fault 
1000 XI dominates feedback fault - function fault 
0111 Data Output fault 
0110 XI dominates feedback fault - function fault 
0101 Multiple fault, external feedback not affected 
0100 XI dominates feedback fault - function fault 
0011 Equivalent to X4 fault 
0010 XI dominates feedback fault - function fault 
0001 Equivalent to an XI function fault 
0000 XI dominates feedback fault - function fault 
Table 7-7 The fault code placed on the fault injection channels and the code description. 
Table 7-7 shows that by applying the code 0011, an X6 and an X5 fault, the 
equivalent of an X4 fault is applied. Furthermore, it is possible to provide 
combinations offaults that have no equivalent (IOOI).The appropriate fault injection 
codes were applied to the IFIS DART during otherwise normal operation. The codes 
were later removed to discover the permanence of each injected fault. Before injecting 
different faults by changing the fault injection code, a system reset was performed and 
normal operation resumed. 
7.6 RESULTS 
Table 7-8 shows the results of performing diagnosis on the IFIS DART using a 
dictionary containing halting sequences for all possible Xl, X3, X5, X6 and X7 faults 
on all IFIS cells within the design. The columns labelled actual fault and diagnosed 
fault list contain fault descriptions. The descriptions are of the format Cell name: 
Fault type. Therefore the fault code 1110 injects an Xl fault in cell Cl. The observed 
halting sequences at the primary outputs of the FPGA containing the IFIS DART were 
diagnosed as being consistent with a number of different possible fault sites. These 
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included an Xl fault in cell Cl and a number of other candidates. 
Fault Code Actual Fault Diagnosed Fault List 
1111 No fault No fault 
1110 Cl:Xl Cl:Xl, Cl :X3, PI :X5, CO:X6, CO:X7 
1101 Cl:X3 Cl:Xl, Cl:X3, Pl:X5, CO:X6, CO:X7 
1100 Cl:Xl (dominant) Cl:Xl, Cl:X3, Pl:X5, CO:X6, CO:X7 
1011 Cl:X5 CO:Xl, CO:X3, Cl:X5, UFB:X6, UFB:X7 
1010 Cl:Xl (dominant) Cl:Xl, Cl:X3, Pl:X5, CO:X6, CO:X7 
1001 Cl:X3, Cl:X5 Not diagnosable (no match) 
1000 Cl:Xl (dominant) Cl:Xl, Cl :X3, PI :X5, CO:X6, CO:X7 
0111 Cl:X6 Pl:Xl, Pl:X3, P2:X5, Cl:X6, Cl:X7 
0110 Cl:Xl (dominant) Cl:Xl, Cl:X3, Pl:X5, CO:X6, CO:X7 
0101 Cl:X3, Cl:X6 Not diagnosable (no match) 
0100 Cl:Xl (dominant) Cl:Xl, Cl:X3, Pl:X5, CO:X6, CO:X7 
0011 Cl:X4(Xl) Cl:Xl, Cl:X3, Pl:X5, CO:X6, CO:X7 
0010 Cl:Xl (dominant) Cl:Xl, Cl:X3, Pl:X5, CO:X6, CO:X7 
0001 Cl :Xl (equivalent) Cl:Xl, Cl:X3, Pl:X5, CO:X6, CO:X7 
0000 Cl:Xl (dominant) Cl:Xl, Cl:X3, Pl:X5, CO:X6, CO:X7 
Table 7-8 Diagnosis a/the injected/aults. 
The data contained in Table 7-8 shows that diagnosed fault lists contain a specific 
grouping of fault types that are indistinguishable when halting of primary outputs is 
used for diagnosis. Closer examination of Table 7-8 reveals the following: 
• Each diagnosed fault list contains only a single representative of each type of 
fault. Therefore if the type of fault were known, the parent cell can be 
identified. 
• There is no situation that results in the false diagnosis of a non-existent fault. 
The results of diagnosis are therefore not misleading. 
• In all cases the intended fault, the dominant fault or an equivalent fault was 
correctly identified and appears within the diagnosed fault list. 
• It is not always possible to positively match mUltiple faults (Cl:X3, Cl :X6 has 
no equivalent). However, no false diagnosis was given. 
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Figure 7-9 The relation between fault types which are indistinguishable when halting of 
primary outputs is usedfor diagnosis. 
Figure 7-9 shows the relation between indistinguishable fault types and their relative 
logical positions within the system architecture. In Figure 7-9 it is apparent that faults 
occurring in the function block of a specific cell are indistinguishable from faults 
occurring in the connections to/from the same cell. This clearly demonstrates that the 
maximum resolution that can be expected using this technique is to the IFIS cell level. 
7.7 CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this investigation was to discover the influence of the halting inherent 
in IFIS designs on the ability to perform diagnosis on them. The approach taken was 
to identify a strategy for performing fault diagnosis in IFIS designs, assess the 
inherent diagnostic limitations of the strategy and then discover if the strategy could 
be simply implemented. 
Fault diagnosis was successfully performed on the FPGA implementation of the IFIS 
UART using only the relative . halting times of primary system outputs. This 
demonstrates the feasibility of the technique. The advantages of using this fault 
diagnosis method are summarised below: 
• Diagnosis can be performed using primary design inputs and outputs without 
internal probing. 
• IFIS properties are exploited allowing the simple concept of dictionary based 
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diagnosis to be applied to sequential designs. 
• The dictionary generation can be automated. 
• The resources required to build and store the fault diagnosis dictionary are 
dependent on the number of IFIS cells in the system and not necessarily the 
complexity of the design. 
• Once a dictionary has been generated for a specific design, it can be reused. 
• Diagnosis can be performed by analysing the output halting sequence observed 
during production testing. 
• Diagnosis in-the-field may be simplified because fault stimulation need not be 
repeated if the output halting information is available following on-line error 
detection. Simplifying field diagnosis can hasten repair thus increasing system 
availability. 
The following disadvantages are associated with the fault diagnosis method: 
• The highest diagnostic resolution is restricted to the IFIS cell level. For 
manufacturing diagnosis, this resolution is not sufficient. However, this 
technique may be applicable as part of a hierarchical diagnostic methodology. 
• To ensure maximum diagnostic resolution for a specific design, constraints are 
imposed on the architecture. 
While the halting based diagnosis technique may prove adequate for identifying a 
faulty module, a supplementary diagnosis technique that can bypass the IFIS protocol 
may be required if diagnosis is to be of significant use to an le manufacturer. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 OBJECTIVES OF CHAPTER 
This chapter concludes the thesis. It reviews the objectives of the thesis and 
summarises the conclusions resulting from Chapter 2 in addition to those from the 
investigations described in this thesis. Additionally, the success of the investigations 
is considered and limitations presented. This chapter concludes by suggesting ways in 
which this research may be extended. 
8.2 REVIEW OF OBJECTIVES 
This thesis has assessed different aspects of the IFIS methodology. More specifically, 
the aims of this thesis were: 
• To identify protocol/coding schemes that provide the haIting mechanism 
characteristic of IFIS systems and to assess their impact on system level test 
coverage, complexity and performance. 
• To discover the utility of the halting sequence information available at primary 
outputs for locating the source of error. 
To enable the aims to be achieved, the following objectives were identified: 
• To quantify the restrictions on performance and test coverage imposed by 
different dual-rail codes and protocols. 
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• To assess the characteristics of test coverage, complexity and performance 
associated with different circuit design techniques used to implement the 
chosen IFIS protocol. 
• To characterise a demonstration IFIS system that incorporates multiple 
computation elements that are interconnected such that the IPIS protocol is 
enforced. 
• To quantify the diagnostic resolution attainable based only on the halting 
sequence of primary system outputs following error detection. 
In Chapter 2 design techniques developed to support on-line testing were presented in 
order to assess their· suitability for adoption within IFIS systems. The following 
conclusions were drawn: 
• Of coding schemes examined, none intended for on-line testing was inherently 
capable of detecting timing errors caused by manufacturing defects. 
• Dual-rail-coding schemes developed for asynchronous designs support 
modular checker design and can detect such timing and unidirectional errors. 
The application of such schemes to on-line testing has not been characterised. 
• The suitability of specific on-line test techniques that were intended for 
computation, to the generation of dual-rail codes was not quantified. 
A series of investigations were identified in Chapter 3 to address the above issues. The 
outcome of these investigations was an assessment of the impact on system 
characteristics imposed by coding and protocol combinations supporting the IFIS 
halting mechanism. Additionally, conclusions could be made regarding the effects of 
the halting mechanism on the ability to perform failure diagnosis within IFIS systems. 
8.3 MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
This section presents the main conclusions resulting from the investigations that were 
performed. 
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System level perfonnance can be restricted by the protocol and coding scheme: of 
those examined in Chapter 4, the highest perfonnance is exhibited by inelastic 
protocols based on a saturated coding scheme. 
The pennanence of system halting is affected by the protocol and the specific nodes 
monitored. Chapter 4 contains evidence that to provide pennanent halting requires an 
inelastic protocol that monitors the outputs of consecutive cells, namely: the 
predecessor cell, current cell, and successor cell. 
The potential for the protocol and coding to restrict on-line test coverage is caused by 
restricting the ratio of codewords to non-codewords, thus restricting the range of 
vectors that can be used for on-line fault stimulation. It was shown in Chapter 4 that 
the ratio of codewords to non-codewords is increasingly restricted by raising the 
number of monitored nodes (protocol conditions) and/or by reducing the range of 
symbols that represent codewords. 
Despite the restriction in stimuli applicable to IFIS cells during nonnal operation, it is 
possible to construct IFIS cells that exhibit high levels of on-line test coverage. 
Chapter 5 provides evidence that in order to obtain a high level of on-line test 
coverage, while also being applicable to any digital function, the duality architecture 
is the most suitable for code computation in IFIS cells. Alternatives to duality are 
available for IFIS code computation but to gain more attractive complexity statistics 
than the duality architecture requires forfeiting test coverage, data throughput or 
generality. Within IFIS cells, a simple decoder is used for checking incoming codes 
and a multiplexer is used to control data-flow. This architecture is low in complexity 
and provides high test coverage due to the indirect observability of the decoder output 
by virtue of the IFIS halting characteristic. 
The interconnection of IFIS cells facilitates the testing of the checker circuitry used 
within each IFIS cell for transmission control. This is because an artificial fault 
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condition (non-codeword) can be injected at the IFIS system interface, thus enabling 
the IFIS halting mechanism to be exercised. 
The investigation described in Chapter 6 shows that by interconnecting IFIS cells such 
that they support the selected protocol, on-line testable systems exhibiting the register 
transfer level data-flow of their conventional counterparts can be realised. 
Furthermore, the characteristics of such systems are consistent with expectations. The 
ability to convert any synchronous digital system to an on-line testable equivalent 
using IFIS techniques makes the IFIS methodology attractive. The ability to predict 
the impact of such a conversion for any such system enables its feasibility to be 
assessed. 
In Chapter 7 it was shown that the maximum resolution to which failure diagnosis can 
be performed using only the halting sequence of IFIS system outputs is limited to that 
of a single IFIS cell. This level of resolution may be further restricted if insufficient 
observation points are provided. 
As increasingly complex systems emerge, the requirement to perform on-line testing 
may dominate over complexity issues. The inherent error management coupled with 
high levels of error coverage, low performance impact and simple failure diagnosis 
makes IFIS an attractive option. 
8.4 MEASURES OF SUCCESS 
The literature review presented in Chapter 2 showed that design techniques supporting 
on-line testing for protecting computation and for protecting communication have 
been individually developed. Coding techniques normally associated with 
asynchronous designs were identified as possessing characteristics that could be 
suitable for protecting communications between computation elements while also 
being suitable to system design. 
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The investigations were chosen to provide an understanding of the implications of 
adopting such a technique to provide on-line testing. The investigations have resulted 
in the following: 
• A quantitative assessment of the restrictions on performance, behaviour and 
test coverage imposed by different dual-rail codes and protocols that cause 
halting after error detection. 
• An assessment of the effects of using different techniques to design IFIS cells 
that support the chosen IFIS protocol. The characteristics of test coverage, 
complexity and performance were quantified for each technique. 
• The characterisation of a demonstration IFIS system that incorporates multiple 
computation elements that are interconnected such that the IFIS protocol is 
enforced. 
• A quantitative assessment of the diagnostic resolution attainable by examining 
only the halting sequence ofIFIS system outputs following error detection. 
This research can be used by system designers to assess the feasibility of 
implementing an IFIS version of any specific synchronous digital system. This work 
is of particular value because both qualitative and a quantitative approaches have been 
adopted to describe the advantages of the presented techniques. This thesis has 
provided detailed information while also placing it in the context of system design. 
Furthermore, it has demonstrated the developed design techniques by applying them 
to a hardware implementation of a complex and representative system. 
8.5 LIMITATIONS 
The following limitations apply to this research: 
The UART design while complex for a small design team with strict time limitations 
is relatively small in comparison with the large designs appearing in the IC industry. 
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This effects not only the degree to which the UART can be considered representative, 
but also the complexity of the experimental vehicle used for failure diagnosis. 
It was decided to use IFIS cell design techniques that support generic function 
generation, as opposed to arithmetic, iterative or Boolean calculation because of the 
associated simplification in design-flow. If less generic approaches had been 
implemented and their characteristics empirically quantified, the test coverage 
limitations imposed by them could have been more accurately assessed. This would 
have provided additional information allowing an assessment of the benefits and costs 
associated with using a non-generic approach. 
Due to the limited number of available IFIS designs, the quantity of data representing 
IFIS systems does not allow predictions to be made regarding the typical maximum 
resolution that can be expected from fault diagnosis performed on IFIS designs. 
No formal investigation to identify specific IFIS design rules that maximise the ability 
to diagnose failure was performed. A discussion was presented in Chapter 7 that 
describes the architectural influence on diagnostic resolution, however this was not 
developed into an algorithm that could be applied to analyse IFIS designs. 
While performance characteristics were obtained by simulation, the hardware could 
not be stimulated at this speed. Furthermore, the characteristics of FPGAs are not 
necessarily representative of ASICs. 
The diagnosis algorithms presented in this thesis do not consider the effects of 
multiple fault sources. 
The complexity measurements do not take account of the additional routing imposed 
by the IFIS methodology. 
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8.6 FURTHER WORK 
This section presents further work that has been identified as a potentially useful 
extension to the current work. Furthermore, additional investigations are proposed that 
exhibit a strong relationship to the work described within this thesis. 
8.6.1 Extension of Current Work 
. Logic duplication was selected to generate independent data and reference information 
within IFIS cells. Investigations should be undertaken to explore the possibility of 
fmding and characterising new methods for generating reference information that 
exploit the CMOS technology. 
The maximum diagnostic resolution achieved using halting sequence is to the IFIS 
cell level. This can only be achieved when the IFrS architecture is constrained. 
Currently, IFIS designs are only confirmed as being diagnosable to this level of 
resolution following dictionary generation. An investigation of ways of checking and 
changing IFIS systems to ensure that they are diagnosable to this resolution should be 
undertaken. 
While diagnostic resolution to the cell level is advantageous for identifying faulty rcs 
within an IFIS system or identifying a specific rFIS cell within an IC, higher levels of 
resolution are required by IC manufacturers. Therefore, further effort should be 
directed at investigating ways of improving the efficiency of diagnosis to the current 
level of resolution and exploring ways of increasing the diagnostic resolution. 
Resolution might be efficiently increased by combining the information available in 
the halting sequence with a conventional approach that circumvents the IFIS protocol. 
8.6.2 New Investigations 
A disadvantage associated with IFIS is the complexity of resultant systems. The 
complexity associated with computational elements has been quantified and is 
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comparable with DWC. However, the area complexity associated with routing has not 
been quantified. Clearly, an increase in area associated with routing may increase the 
chances of failure. An assessment of the probability of failure associated with routing 
in IFIS systems would facilitate the choice of a protection scheme offering the 
minimum level of required protection. The implications of choosing an alternative 
scheme to dual-rail coding on checker complexity and ease of implementation require 
investigation. 
In IFIS systems, hand shaking provides a mechanism to control data flow following 
computation completion. In this thesis, coding was used to provide handshaking. In 
CMOS designs, current sensing offers an alternative to the examination of code 
sequence for providing completion detection. The application of this kind of 
completion detection to IFIS would remove the requirement to use communication 
code sequences based on monotonic transitions and may therefore permit less 
expensive codes to be used. The implications of using a different coding scheme 
would therefore require investigation. 
8.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented the main conclusions that were reached as a result of the 
investigations described in this thesis. This serves the function of relating the 
intermediate conclusions to form an overall impression of what has been achieved. 
In addition to combining the results from the investigations, this chapter has also 
assessed the degree to which the investigations have addressed the aims and 
objectives set out in Chapter 1 and Chapter 3. The limitations imposed by time and 
facilities were set out thus enabling the scope of the conclusions to be determined. 
Finally, this chapter has presented a summary of the. contributions made by this 
research concluding with suggestions for work in important related areas that would 
benefit from future research investment. 
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